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This thesis compares development programs in two states, Andhra Pradesh and 
Chhattisgarh, that have been affected by the Maoist insurgency in India, also known as 
Naxalism. It provides a history of Naxalism as well as an examination of the various 
attempts to combat them in both states. While the “law and order” approach has long 
been preferred to counter the Naxal threat, recently there has been a shift in favor of the 
“hearts and minds” approach, embodied by the development programs under the 
Integrated Action Plan (IAP). The thesis assesses these programs across the two states 
and how effective they have been in obtaining their objective of reducing Naxalite 
violence. This thesis finds that, while the IAP schemes are still new and thus difficult to 
evaluate, there are many projects underway in both states despite continued Naxal 
activity and lack of governance in those states. The presence of good governance can 
indicate how quickly the IAP programs will be successful, but it does not necessarily 
mean that the programs will fail where governance is lacking. Violence associated with 
Naxalism has declined in both states recently, seemingly corresponding with the increase 
in governance that these programs bring to adivasi communities.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis examines the history behind the Naxalite, Maoist insurgency, 
movement and compares the counterinsurgency strategies employed in two neighboring 
states, Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh, focusing specifically on development programs 
implemented through the Integrated Action Plan (IAP). In the past two years, the Indian 
central government has increasingly turned towards development schemes, encompassed 
within the IAP, as a means to disrupt the Maoist insurgency, which deters economic 
investment in the regions where it is active. While Andhra Pradesh has seen a relatively 
successful application of IAP programs, and a rapid decline in Maoist-related violence, 
Chhattisgarh’s successes have been more tempered.   
Andhra Pradesh has a long and positive history in combating Naxalism, by both 
paramilitary and development means. Chhattisgarh, on the other hand, has generally 
embraced a largely unsuccessful law and order approach, and has only recently begun to 
espouse development projects as a means of fighting Left Wing Extremism (LWE) under 
the auspices of the IAP. Furthermore, Andhra Pradesh is an older state with a relatively 
strong system of governance, while Chhattisgarh was founded in 2000 and has had 
difficulty reaching sections of its population, particularly in remote, tribal regions where 
Naxalism flourishes. This analysis explores the extent to which IAP programs have 
helped decrease Naxalite violence and the perspectives gained during the two years since 
the IAP’s creation to help in future counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Naxal-
afflicted states. There is minimal analysis on the effectiveness of these programs has been 
undertaken. This thesis strives to help fill this gap. 
My findings point towards economic development as being helpful in combating 
Naxalism. Since the IAP’s implementation, violence has declined in both Andhra Pradesh 
and Chhattisgarh, and many have attributed this to the success of the IAP. The strong 
coordination between state and central governments over these development projects 
seems to demonstrate that backwards areas, where Naxalism has traditionally found a 
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following, are positively effected by the demonstration of constructive action on the part 
of the state. Furthermore, economic investment in the regions is on the rise, reflecting 
confidence on the part of businesses that their interests will be safe. The implementation 
has not been perfect, however, and, as I will describe in my conclusion, there has been a 
major push for more localized applications of IAP projects. Lastly, while the program has 
enjoyed considerable success in both states studied, the preexistence of state programs 
designed to combat the Naxals in Andhra Pradesh, reflecting a relatively strong system of 
governance in that state, has allowed the projects to take off more quickly and 
successfully than in Chhattisgarh, where well-executed anti-Naxalite programs and 
prominent governance are lacking historically.   
B. IMPORTANCE  
The containment of the Maoist insurgency is a pressing concern in India’s quest 
to expand its economy. As the government of India strives to entice large corporations to 
develop land traditionally inhabited and cultivated by local indigenous populations, 
adivasi, it needs to keep violent unrest at a minimum.1  The Indian government is anxious 
to establish itself on the world’s stage as one of the major superpowers, along with the 
United States and China, and desperate to maintain its annual growth rate of eight percent 
or higher in order to keep up with the global economy as well as the needs of the huge 
influx of young people entering the workforce. Thus, the federal government’s ultimate 
goal in defeating the Naxals is to encourage investment in resource-rich areas, such as 
Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, which has been difficult to do because of Naxalite-
related instability in these regions.2 Without solving its internal security issues, India 
risks losing its rapid economic expansion. While economists speculate that India’s 
economy could become one of the fastest growing in the next two decades, it will need to 
tackle Naxalism effectively in order to keep investors interested.3 
                                                 
1 D. Gopinath, “Contemporary Approaches to Economic Development: The Special Economic Zone 
Programme,” Local Economy 24, nos. 6–7 (September–November 2009): 448–455. 
2 Amy Cheetham, “Naxalite Terrorism and its Effects on the Global Financial Markets,” Global 
Conference on Business and Finance Proceedings 6:2 (2011): 216; Erich Follath, “India at Crossroads on 
Path to Superpower Status,” Spiegel Online International, September 6, 2012, 2.  
3 Cheetham, “Naxalite Terrorism and its Effects on the Global Financial Markets,” 218. 
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Available government and think tank publications over the past two years suggest 
that the Naxalite threat continues to be a serious concern for both domestic and foreign 
investors.4  Since March 2012, there have been several major Maoist attacks, one of 
which involved taking foreigners hostage, drawing significant international attention and 
demonstrating that the Maoists continue to pose a very real threat.5  Corporations are 
driven away not only by potentially violent insurgents but also by the possibility of 
having their reputations aligned with egregious human rights violations and displacement 
in the name of capitalism.6 Human rights organizations as well as India’s own 
government have accused the states’ anti-Naxal militias of human rights abuses (the 
Supreme Court even made a ruling against Chhattisgarh’s Salwa Judum militia group in 
2011). These charges are of concern for corporations as well as the Indian government, 
which has received negative attention for its treatment of the adivasis and how it had 
dealt with the Naxalite threat.7   
The safety of a state’s infrastructure as well as private investors’ property and 
employees is vital in the success of private industry. Private investors are not unaware of 
the threat of Naxalism; in fact, much is written about it in widely-read domestic and 
international publications. Maoist attacks on major investment projects, such as the one in 
2009 on the India-based, multinational Essar Steel pipeline, which pumped iron ore from 
Chhattisgarh to Andhra Pradesh, have seriously deterred further investment in Naxalite-
affected states in the recent past.8 Even as recently as October 2012, the National Mineral 
Development Corporation, which is state-owned and operates mines in Chhattisgarh and 
Karnataka, expressed trepidation over “India’s unpredictable domestic security 
landscape,” due to Maoist activities that have disrupted the company’s production 
                                                 
4 “India Infrastructure Report,” (Government of India, Published by Business Monitor International 
Ltd., Q1–4 2010 and Q1–4 2011); “India Defence and Security Report,” (Government of India, Published 
by Business Monitor International Ltd., Q1–4 2010, Q1–4 2011). 
5 Ajai Sahni, “Maoists: Enduring Strengths,” South Asia Intelligence Review 10, no. 39 (April 2, 
2012), http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/sair10/10_39.htm. 
6 Megha Bahree.  “The Forever War: Inside India’s Maoist Conflict,” World Policy Journal 27: 2 
(Summer 2010): 146–154. 
7 Debnarayan Sarker, “The Implementation of the Forest Rights Act in India; Critical Issues,” 
Economic Affairs 31:2 (2011): 25. 
8 Anusha Subramanian, “In the Red Corridor of Uncertainty,” Business Today, May 16, 2010, 58–62. 
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previously.9 Furthermore, when compared with other rising economies, such as China 
and Brazil, where insurgencies have been relatively well-contained, the Naxalites’ actions 
make investment in India less attractive. Many states that are ripe for investment due to 
their rich mineral resources have been plagued by Naxalism; therefore, unless the 
government takes drastic action to significantly mitigate the insurgents’ threat, the states’ 
reputations could become permanently associated with LWE, having dire consequences 
for the state and national economies.10   
It is in the corporations’ and government’s best interest to keep violence, whether 
at the hands of the Maoists or the government-sponsored militias, at a minimum.11    
Supporting successful economic development enterprises would have the potential of 
satisfying the government, the corporations, and the tribals that live in Naxal-afflicted 
areas. Until the recent introduction of the IAP, which strives to synthesize federal and 
state government efforts in establishing development projects to combat the Naxalites, 
the central government and state government were not well-coordinated in their 
responses to Naxalism.12  As will be described in Chapter III, the federal government and 
state governments are now tied to each other through the IAP schemes, and the state 
governments are accountable to the federal government for its implementation. A 
comprehensive analysis of whether the IAP programs have helped mitigate the Naxalite 
threat will benefit the Indian government and investors, both domestic and foreign. 
Demonstrating that the projects have had success even in a state such as Chhattisgarh, a 
region with a poor record of fighting LWE, could help the government (both federal and 
state) strategize how best to combat Naxalism.   
The IAP is a fairly new program, making it very difficult to understand its impact 
versus the impact of a solely law and order approach. There is no doubt, however, that 
since its implementation, Naxal-related violence has gone down in the two states, albeit 
                                                 
9 “India Mining Report: National Mineral Development Corporation,” Business Monitor International, 
October 1, 2012. 
10 Cheetham, “Naxalite Terrorism and Its Effects on the Global Financial Markets,” 219. 
11 “Chhattisgarh Steel Areas Receive Support to Combat Rebels,” Metal Bulletin Daily 97 (February 
1, 2008): 916. 
12 Cheetham, “Naxalite Terrorism and Its Effects on the Global Financial Markets,” 220. 
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in one more than the other. The purpose of this thesis is to illustrate that there is a real 
impact because of the IAP schemes, which needs to be better understood. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a vast body of work regarding counterinsurgency strategies. Often, 
authors take one of two approaches: “law and order” (or “enemy-centric”) versus “hearts 
and minds” (or “population-centric”). Throughout the security sector, there has been an 
ongoing debate over the best ways in which to combat insurgencies. The Naxalite 
situation is no different. There may never be full consensus on which approach, law and 
order (meaning the use of police and paramilitary forces to attack insurgent cells) versus 
hearts and minds (meaning establishing a respected governance structure), is the most 
effective. Many scholars and policymakers alike seem to agree that a well-thought-out 
combination of the two approaches makes the most sense and that no model fits all: 
“Importantly, the precise approach any government takes to defeat an insurgency depends 
very much on the character of that government…counterinsurgency is never static, 
always evolving.”13    
The law and order approach has long been embraced by many members of the 
strategic and policy communities as the most effective means of bringing down an 
insurgency, as in the case of the Indian government’s methods for dealing with the 
Naxalites. The “U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide” describes this method as:  
a contest with an organized enemy, and focuses COIN activity on the 
insurgent organizations. This approach emphasizes defeat of the enemy as 
its primary task and other activities as supporting efforts…This approach 
can be summarized as “first defeat the enemy, and all else will follow.”14 
This method often involves “shot-gun approach” ––accepting many civilian casualties 
while ruthlessly cracking down on the rebels.15  Security experts like Paul Staniland 
                                                 
13 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010), 1–2. 
14 “U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide,” 14. 
15 P.V. Ramana, “Dealing with Naxalism: ‘Shotgun Approach,’” Observer Research Foundation, 




argue that force is a necessary evil in obtaining a lasting peace amongst populations 
affected by or susceptible to insurgency movements, often causing “a deep tension 
between establishing state authority and winning hearts and minds on the ground.”16  
Without stabilizing the affected region with force, supporters of this concept argue, no 
successful development projects directed at building a solid governance structure can 
proceed. 
Meanwhile, the hearts and minds approach is concerned with developing stability 
within government structures / institutions in communities affected by insurgent violence. 
Instead of focusing on eliminating the enemy through extermination, this method 
attempts to address the root of the problem, so to speak, and to eliminate the enemy 
through providing better alternatives than those the enemy can offer, particularly in the 
form of strong governance structures.17  Good governance is reliant on perceptions of 
legitimacy among the local populations: “Among the mechanisms available to 
counterinsurgents for establishing that legitimacy, one of the most prominent in both 
practice and doctrine has been the improvement of governance in the form of effective 
and efficient administration of government and public services [emphasis added].”18  In 
terms of the Naxalite movement, presumably, if the government can successfully fill the 
void left by the loss of the adivasis’ land, through programs designed to support 
education, job creation, infrastructure development, etc., it will entice them away from 
joining insurgency groups:  
…popular support [for insurgency] from the elites and especially the 
masses stems primarily from concrete grievances concerning such things 
as land reform, injustice, unfair taxation, and corruption. It is over these 
                                                 
16 Paul Staniland, “Counterinsurgency is a Bloody, Costly Business,” Foreign Policy, November 24, 
2009, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/11/24/counterinsurgency_is_a_bloody_costly_business.  
17 See: John Nagl, David Petraeus, James Amos, U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3–24 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007); Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency; Lalwani, “India’s Approach to 
Counterinsurgency and the Naxalite Problem,” 5; “U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide”; George J. 
Kunnath, “Becoming a Naxalite in Rural Bihar: Class Struggle and Its Contradictions,” The Journal of 
Peasant Studies 33:1 (January 2006): 89–123; P.V. Ramana, “Naxalism and Internal Security in India,” 
Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies (August 4, 2007): http://www.ipcs.org/seminar/naxalite-
violence/naxalism-and-internal-security-in-india-672.html;   
18 Michael Fitzsimmons, “Hard Hearts and Open Minds? Governance, Identity and the Intellectual 
Foundations of Counterinsurgency Strategy,” Journal of Strategic Studies 31:3 (2008): 338. 
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issues that the battle to win hearts and minds is most directly enjoined. 
History suggests that a government can most effectively undercut 
insurgencies that rely on mass support by splitting the rank and file away 
from the leadership through calculated reforms that address the material 
grievances and needs of the people.19  
Because the Naxalite movement is not new, having begun in 1967, the literature 
describing the group’s doctrines, objectives, and activities, as well as the government’s 
attempts to combat them is fairly substantial. Much has been written regarding the 
Naxalites’ differences from the other, politically recognized Communist Party of India 
(Marxist) from whom the Naxalites broke in 1967, forming the unrecognized Communist 
Party of India (Maoist). The core difference between the two parties revolves around the 
Maoists’ focus on a revolution beginning in the country versus the urban centers and, 
more significantly, on the Maoists’ promotion of violent overthrow in order to achieve 
their objectives.20  Although the Naxalites were successfully suppressed under Indira 
Gandhi’s regime, they reemerged with a vengeance in the 1990s, becoming more 
aggressive as the decade wore on, presumably in response to the increased economic 
activity and exploitation of lands in adivasi-controlled areas brought about by economic 
growth in the country. By the early 2000s, various Maoist factions determined that it 
would be in their best interest to join forces and united under a single banner.21  Due to 
the success of Indira Gandhi’s “iron fist” approach to Naxalism during the 1970s, as well 
as the triumphs of K.P.S. Gill against the insurgency in Punjab during the 1990s, the 
federal and state governments have long promoted the significance of abundant police 
and paramilitary forces as a means of bringing down insurgencies.22   
                                                 
19 Bard O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse, 2nd ed. (Washington, 
DC: Potomac Books, 2005): 171–172. 
20 Lalwani, “India’s Approach to Counterinsurgency and the Naxalite Problem,” CTC Sentinel 4:10 
(October, 2011): 6. 
21 Jennifer L. Oetken, “Counterinsurgency against Naxalites in India,” in India and 
Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned, ed. Ganguly, Sumit and David P. Fidler (New York: Routledge, 
2009), 135, 142–144. 
22 Oetken, “Counterinsurgency against Naxalites in India,” 135, 142–144; K.P.S. Gill, “Imperatives of 
Justice,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, April 30, 2005, 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/kpsgill/governance/07june25Pio.htm.  
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In his 2006 speech, which drew national attention to the escalating violence 
caused by the Naxalites since 2004 when they consolidated various communist insurgent 
factions and created the Communist Party of India (Maoist), Prime Minister Singh called 
for a two-pronged approach to fighting the insurgents.23  According to his speech, this 
strategy would include both security and development elements.24  Even within the text 
of the entire speech, however, much more time was spent discussing the security 
crackdown that would require coordination between the state and federal governments.25  
Since 2003, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) has been tasked with combating 
insurgents, with very minimal success and often more casualties than the insurgents.26  
Despite the government’s attempts to intensify the CRPF’s effectiveness with the launch 
of a surge called “Operation Green Hunt” in 2009, it has been largely ineffective: 
between 2008 and 2010, there was a 63 percent increase in Naxalite-related casualties. 
Thus, the government increasingly turned to paramilitary operations, such as Salwa 
Judum, which use aggressive and often vicious action that goes widely unchecked.27   
These operations demonstrate the government’s initial dedication to the law and 
order approach. This was due in large part to some policymakers and scholars alike who 
advocated the belief that without subduing militarily the Naxalites first, any economic 
development programs to help affected areas that might be attempted would fail.28  Thus, 
in an apparent direct contradiction to the Prime Minister’s promise that, “when it comes 
to making resources available for these core development activities having such a vital 
bearing on the welfare of the poorest sections of our community, [the] Government of 
                                                 
23 “Naxal Problem Needs a Holistic Approach,” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 
Ministry of Home Affairs, July 22, 2009, http://www.pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=50833. 
24 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, “PM’s Speech at the Chief Minister’s Meeting on Naxalism,”  
(speech, Chief Minister’s Meeting on Naxalism, New Delhi, April 13, 2006) http://pmindia.nic.in/speech-
details.php?nodeid=302. 
25 Ibid.   
26 Praveen Swami, “India’s Counter-insurgency Conundrum,” Hindu, July 23, 2010, 
http://www.hindu.com/2010/07/23/stories/2010072354911200.htm. 
27 Varun Vira, “Counterinsurgency in India: The Maoists,” Small Wars Journal (December 7, 2011): 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/counterinsurgency-in-india-the-maoists. 
28 “India Defence and Security Report, Q1 2010,” 34. 
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India will not be stingy in allocating additional resources for these activities,” resources 
have been largely concentrated on police action:  
Despite Indian official doctrine formally espousing this concept and some 
contentions that India has always seen COIN as a “political rather than 
military problem,” a closer look reveals that the Indian approach may be 
better characterized as a strategy of attrition with the deployment of “raw 
state coercion” and “enemy-centric” campaigns to suffocate an insurgency 
through a “saturation of forces.”29 
Time and again, reports have suggested that the Naxalite issue is one of poor governance, 
but the government “has effectively treated the insurgency as a security concern, to be 
addressed primarily with paramilitary forces.”30  At best, scholars seem to agree that 
India’s approach to fighting the insurgents has been one of trying out different formulas, 
without truly committing to one strategy or another: “ India has been earnestly testing 
different COIN strategies to combat a growing Maoist threat throughout its center and 
east known generally as the Naxalite insurgency.”31 
Though it is true that effective development projects are difficult to implement in 
areas rife with insurgents determined to frustrate all government efforts, no matter how 
beneficial they might ultimately prove, the government’s highly undisciplined and 
ruthless approach has garnered more enemies than it subdued.32  Many scholars seem to 
agree that this is a classic example of Indian counterinsurgency measures, which have 
worked well in certain regions such as Kashmir and Punjab, but have failed in offsetting 
the Naxalite threat: “Only lip service is paid to Western-style population-centric strategy; 
CI [counterinsurgency] forces are present to target insurgents, not secure the 
population.”33  The government-sponsored militias have frequently targeted non-
affiliated indigenous peoples, alienating them and making them more likely to turn to 
Maoism in hopes of protection than they were before the government crackdown:  
                                                 
29 Lalwani, “India’s Approach to Counterinsurgency and the Naxalite Problem,” 5. 
30 “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment–South Asia: India,” Jane’s Information Group, 2012: 22. 
31 Lalwani, “India’s Approach to Counterinsurgency and the Naxalite Problem,” 5. 
32 Jay Griffiths, “Operation Green Hunt,” Orion 29:5 (2010): 10; Vira, “Counterinsurgency in India.” 
33 Vira, “Counterinsurgency in India.” 
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The resultant flood of ill-trained and ill-equipped soldiers conducting 
large-scale sweep and commando operations has exposed civilian 
populations to collateral damage and abuse, increased Maoist legitimacy 
and recruitment, and left populations open to reprisal attacks by 
insurgents.34  
In fighting Naxalism, the state governments of Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh 
have employed different approaches in terms of the two prongs espoused by India’s 
federal government: one being aggressive, paramilitary and police action, and the second 
being the application of development programs. Andhra Pradesh has had success with 
both while Chhattisgarh lags behind in both categories. Both states are confronted with 
similar economic realities, particularly in terms of land exploitation, but different realities 
in terms of established, effective governance.   
Much of the literature follows the government’s approach when it comes to 
discussing the successes and failures of the COIN operations undertaken by the Indian 
government, focusing on the security-oriented options as opposed to the development 
ones. While much attention has been paid to the success of the law and order approach in 
Andhra Pradesh and its failure in Chhattisgarh, little has been said about the development 
programs in both states.35  While heralding the Andhra Pradesh-based Greyhound police 
force as a significant reason that counterinsurgency has worked better in Andhra Pradesh 
than in its neighboring states, one author notes that the state also benefitted from 
“measurably implemented well-crafted community development programs.”36  
Meanwhile, he highlights the government’s general fixation on paramilitary options, as 
opposed to development ones: “Unfortunately[,] through the militarized lens of India’s 
counterinsurgency campaign, only the warfighting elements of Andhra Pradesh’s strategy 
have been replicated with earnest.”37   
                                                 
34 Vira, “Counterinsurgency in India.” 
35 Harinder Baweja, “Do We Want Our Troops to Get Stuck Like the Americans in Afghanistan? 
Interview with KPS Gill,” Tehelka Magazine 6:42 (October 24, 2009), 
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main43.asp?filename=Ne241009coverstory.asp. 
36 Vira, “Counterinsurgency in India: The Maoists.”  
37 Ibid. 
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Clearly, more analysis is needed in order to assess the value of India’s IAP 
programs in order to implement them more effectively and justify their expense. This 
paper’s intention is not to decide whether the law and order approach to combating 
Naxalism trumps an approach focused on development. Instead, I strive to analyze the 
hearts and minds approach (which centers heavily on development) through the lens of 
public services centered around development programs in the newly-implemented 
Integrated Action Plan programs in Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, both of which 
historically have been hotbeds of Maoist activity but which have taken relatively different 
approaches towards fighting them in the past. 
Since 2006, when Prime Minister Singh declared, “It would not be an 
exaggeration to say that the problem of naxalism is the single biggest internal security 
challenge ever faced by our country,” a number of initiatives have been undertaken at 
both the state and federal levels to try to mitigate the growing Maoist insurgency.38  
While solutions to the Maoist insurgency have been widely debated, there does not 
appear to be a consensus on the best way to combat the Naxalites. Scholars and 
policymakers alike have reached similar conclusions on what has caused the rise in 
violence since the early 2000s, however: rapid and relatively unchecked expansion of 
privatization of tribal lands to be used for economic development.39  
Because Andhra Pradesh is largely considered a “success story” in terms of 
combating the Naxalites, its methods in fighting the insurgents have been studied in 
depth.40  Much attention has been paid to the state’s Greyhound security force, 
specifically trained in the art of guerilla warfare, for example.41  In an entire chapter 
written by Jennifer Oetken dedicated to COIN operations designed to combat Naxalism, 
however, there is no mention made of alternatives to the militarized approach; not even in 
the case of Andhra Pradesh, which has been acknowledged as having not only a superior 
                                                 
38 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, “PM’s Speech at the Chief Minister’s Meeting on Naxalism.”   
39 Bahree, “The Forever War,” 84. 
40 Jennifer L. Oetken, “Counterinsurgency against Naxalites in India,” 148. 
41 Oetken, “Counterinsurgency against Naxalites in India,” 148–149; Vira, “Counterinsurgency in 
India.” 
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police force but also better implementation of development programs relative to other 
Maoist insurgency-affected states.42  One author even goes so far as to caution that the 
government should not waste too many valuable resources attempting to replicate the 
Greyhounds’ success because strong evidence exists to suggest that the Greyhounds 
merely succeeded in driving the Naxalites into neighboring states, like Chhattisgarh, 
instead of quenching the movement altogether, and due to the fact that “a recent…survey 
of five northern districts of Andhra Pradesh recently cleared of Maoist insurgents,” 
showed that, “the majority of those surveyed still sympathized with Naxalite motives, 
methods, and results.”43 
Due to the backlash caused by the government’s up-until-now preferred 
militaristic approach towards subduing the Naxalites, particularly after the advent of 
“Operation Green Hunt,” the tides are turning in favor of developmental solutions to the 
problems that the Maoists pose: “India has admittedly prioritized rural development—
elevating its ministry to a cabinet level position in 2011—and significantly increased 
allocations to Maoist-affected areas through targeted entitlements.”44  This pivot in the 
direction of development projects can be seen in the government’s press releases over the 
past year and a half, as well as in its actions. In the most recent economic survey, it notes 
that India’s central government’s spending on social services and rural development has 
increased from 13.38 percent of the total budget in 2006–2007 to 18.47 percent of the 
total budget in 2011–2012.45   
Very recently, the federal government has adopted various IAP programs, which 
contain a multi-faceted approach based around development programs.46  The IAP grants 
large discretionary funds ($460 million for 2011–2012, alone) to states (for states to use 
in designated Naxal-affected districts) that have been deemed as threatened by the 
                                                 
42 Oetken, “Counterinsurgency against Naxalites in India,” 127–150. 
43 Lalwani, “India’s Approach to Counterinsurgency and the Naxalite Problem,” 8. 
44 Ibid. 
45 “Economic Survey of India, 2011–2012,” Government of India, Ministry of Finance, 
indiabudget.nic.in/es2011–12/echap-01.pdf. 
46 “Integrated Action Plan Needed to Check Naxalism: Raman Singh,” Indian Express, November 20, 
2011. 
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Naxalites, then: “District officers can use the money to provide facilities like drinking 
water, electricity, roads, sanitation and health services.”47  The IAP funds are meant to 
help fund new development projects, as well as to support pre-existing ones, such as the 
Forest Rights Act (FRA), the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Act (MGNREGA), and the Pradhan Mantir Gramin Sadak Yojayana Act (PMGSY), 
which is a road construction project.48  Currently, there are over 70,706 projects being 
sponsored in affected areas and 48,992 have been completed, demonstrating that the 
program can work.49   
In states with a history of good governance relative to other states where the 
Naxalites are active, such as Andhra Pradesh, the IAP schemes have been effectively 
used to combat the insurgents, evidenced through a dramatic decrease in Maoist-related 
violence. In the eight Naxalite-affected districts in Andhra Pradesh that have received 
IAP funding alone, the local governments have established the Department of Remote 
and Interior Areas Development (RIAD) and the Integrated Tribal Development 
Agencies (IDTAs), which have “focused on strengthening of infrastructure in the areas of 
Transport, Communication, Schools, Hostels, Health, Youth employment etc., in remote 
and interior areas. Massive land distribution to tribals is undertaken. Welfare and 
Developmental programmes are implemented effectively in all remote and interior 
areas.”50  Of the nine states targeted by the IAP, Andhra Pradesh is “second in 
performance with over 77% utilisation of Central funds.”51  In Chhattisgarh, where 
Naxalite violence continues to be a major problem and where governance is not nearly as 
                                                 
47 Eric Randolph, “Development, Security and Maoist Insurgency,” Current Intelligence, July 11, 
2011, http://www.currentintelligence.net/features/2011/7/11/development-security-and-maoist-
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well established as in Andhra Pradesh, only 51 percent of the designated IAP funds have 
been appropriated; still, given its history with anti-Naxal operations, this is a huge 
improvement for Chhattisgarh.52   
As the IAP-sponsored programs are relatively new, there is little available 
scholarly literature on their implications for the anti-Naxalite movement. Most 
information about the implementation of the IAP comes from newspaper / online articles 
or official government documents. No comprehensive academic study assessing the 
programs’ successes. Although there is evidence of widespread corruption in states that 
the IAP projects aim to help, as well as Maoist attacks linked to combating the delivery 
of aid/disrupt the development programs that are a part of the IAP, the positive impact of 
these programs in disturbing the Maoist insurgency should not be underestimated: “… 
sincere development is appreciated – in February 2011 the Maoist abduction of a district 
collector known for being an efficient and honest administrator led to tribal rallies and 
protests, forcing his release.”53  Recent comments by government officials suggest that 
the government is pleased with the IAP programs’: “The ambitious Integrated Action 
Plan for Naxal-hit districts for developing infrastructure has been a success, Home 
Minister P. Chidambaram said.”54   
In addition, within the academic community, there is a lack of literature dedicated 
to the effectiveness of development programs in combating insurgencies: “Despite the 
important role that development projects are beginning to play in counterinsurgency 
efforts, there is very limited empirical evidence on the subject.”55  Although the Indian 
government’s traditional response to Naxalism has been one of law and order, the lack of 
success in many of the hardest-hit regions demonstrates the need for a different approach 
(or at least an additional approach in conjunction with a security-oriented one):  
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The Naxalite insurgency—posturing itself as a “people’s war”—comports 
more with classic COIN theory that was built on notions of competitive 
state building to address economic and governance deficiencies. In step 
with their historical experience, however, the Indian state has generally 
favored a more kinetic approach to counterinsurgency over winning 
“hearts and minds.”56 
With its recent pivot towards development as a means of fighting against the Naxalites, 
as opposed to the previously preferred war of attrition, there needs to be a deeper 
understanding of the costs and benefits of the programs funded by the IAP in order to 
make their application as effective and efficient as possible. This paper will help 
contribute to that effort. 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis compares economic development programs in two states that have 
been affected by Naxalism, Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. In recent years, Maoist 
attacks in both states have declined, but in one state, Andhra Pradesh, this has been more 
rapid. My findings lead me to believe that the successful introduction of Integrated 
Action Plan schemes has assisted in this decline, but also that a strong preexisting 
governance structure and anti-Naxalite development operations has made the drop in 
Naxal-related violence faster in Andhra Pradesh than in Chhattisgarh.  
I have consulted a variety of sources in reaching my conclusions: scholarly 
journals, policy papers, newspaper articles, government reports, economic activity 
reports, as well as books on the history of the insurgency and resources addressing 
economic development as a means of combating insurgencies, more generally.   
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
I begin my thesis with a brief history of the Maoist insurgency in India as well as 
in Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. Chapter II explores the possible explanations for the 
Naxalites’ appeal and the various attempts to curb their influence, using the law and order 
and/or hearts and minds approaches. In Chapter III, I discuss the goals of the federal and 
                                                 
56 Lalwani, “India’s Approach to Counterinsurgency and the Naxalite Problem,” 6. 
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state governments in terms of the IAP programs and have specific sections on Andhra 
Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, as well as how successful the government(s) has been in 
implementing them, and how successful they have been in terms of projects completed. 
In Chapter IV, I examine the reasons for the successes and failures of the IAP. Chapter 
IV allows me to focus on areas in which the government (possibly private investors, as 
well) should concentrate its resources and how it should do so (i.e., by making the 
programs more localized) in order to make economic development as efficient as possible 




II. THE HISTORY OF INDIA’S ATTEMPTS TO COMBAT THE 
NAXALITE MOVEMENT 
A. ORIGINS OF NAXALISM 
Since the Naxalite movement began in 1967 in a village called Naxalbari in West 
Bengal, the primary cause of its success has been one thing: a lack of governance.57  As 
is the case with today’s Naxal movement, historically, the movement has found the most 
traction with people who have been marginalized by the government, particularly tribal 
peoples living in rural regions. Since before India’s creation as an independent nation, the 
adivasi have been denied their rights to their land, traditionally the source of their 
livelihood and have found it difficult to find employment elsewhere. 58  Before the recent 
enactment of the Forest Rights Act (FRA) in 2008, discussed in greater detail below, the 
adivasis were granted limited and ineffectual rights under the Indian Forest Act (1927), 
which required a tedious process in order to be recognized as having land rights. For 
those who did not complete this process, and this was the majority of tribal peoples, their 
lands could be seized by the government and resold at any time, resulting in the tribals’ 
eviction from their land and loss of any source of income that came with it.59 
As India has embraced neo-liberal capitalism, beginning in 1991 but intensifying 
in the early 2000s with the introduction of the Special Economic Zone program, the 
government has sold many forested tribal lands to private industries, often without the 
approval of the adivasi.60  The rapid economic expansion in India of the past decade has 
led to increased alienation of the peasant class and indigenous population, who see little 
of the benefits of the growth of industry in their geographical areas. This has led to the 
reemergence of the Naxalites: “The constant expansion of the gap between the rich and 
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60 Archana Prasad, “The Political Economy of ‘Maoist Violence’ in Chhattisgarh,” Social Scientist 38 
(March–April 2010): 6–7; Gopinath, “Contemporary Approaches to Economic Development,” 448–455. 
 18 
poor and the continued exploitation of the Indian working class are the two main 
Naxalites [sic] grievances.”61  In states such as Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, the 
tribal lands appeal to major industries because of their rich mineral deposits and the 
relative ease with which they can obtain land and exploit its natural resources.62  The 
systematic disenfranchisement of local tribal populations by major national and 
international corporations, such as Tata Steel, Reliance Industries Limited, and Jindal 
Steel and Power, creates an excellent environment for Maoist recruitment to occur. 
Naxalites can easily recruit from “the peasant farmer and poor working class [who are] 
unable to benefit from the resources available on their own land.”63 
The fact that tribals compose only nine percent of India’s population but that over 
40 percent of new development projects are on tribal land is telling.64  While the 
government and corporations claim that their presence in these rural and “backwards” 
communities will bring new economic opportunities and help develop infrastructure, 
there seems little evidence to support this: “None of the ore extracted, is used locally; in 
fact, most is exported to Japan. And not one paisa of the fat royalties got by the 
government [from the corporations] goes towards development of the area. Such then is 
the impact of the ‘developmental’ projects on the locals.”65  Not surprisingly, “The five 
states in which the movement [Naxalism] is strongest account for 85% of India’s coal 
deposits.”66    
By marginalizing them for decades, there is massive dislike and distrust of the 
state: “Wherever state institutions are weak or have been discredited in the eyes of the 
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local people, the Maoists seize the opportunity.”67  The Naxalites have methodically 
taken advantage of tribals’ isolation and suspicion of the state over many years:  
This is where the Naxalites got in and entrenched themselves with arms, 
imposing their will—in the beginning to restore land and harvests to the 
tribals, but later to construct their own idea of a Marxist collective state on 
the body of tribal political and economic weaknesses. Over decades, 
tribals were conditioned to recognize Naxals as the “State” and the rest, 
including the government, as enemies.68 
The Naxalite movement has been operational in different capacities for so long that it has 
created its own, highly organized governmental structure, which takes advantage of the 
lack of governance in rural, backwards areas. This is, perhaps, the best example of just 
how deeply linked the Naxal problem is to a lack of governance.   
From village committees, to a judicial system, to local militias, which act as 
policing agents, the Maoists have sought to provide the tribals with what the government 
has either been unable or unwilling to give them. In Chhattisgarh, this kind of behavior 
from the Naxals led to the creation of the vigilante Salwa Judum group, which will be 
discussed in greater detail below.69 Still, when the government is not present, though, the 
people have no one to turn to but the Maoists who provide basic services.70    
It is important to note when tracing the history of Naxalism and attempting to 
uncover the best ways in which to fight against it is that “The cause for rebellion varies 
from state to state,” and that “Each state also has unique land, zoning, industrial and 
security policies that drive both Maoist impulses and government responses.”71  Until the 
last few years, both states were synonymous with Naxalism; now, while Chhattisgarh 
continues to experience high levels of violence related to the insurgency, Andhra Pradesh 
has suppressed the movement relatively successfully.72  The driver of the success of the 
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Naxals in all affected states originally stemmed from the same root cause: the 
government’s historical neglect of the tribal population over land rights and employment 
issues.73  Over the years, this dynamic has changed somewhat in Andhra Pradesh; in 
large part due to the central and state governments’ early paramilitary and development 
programs to combat Naxalism, which led to stronger governance there: “the AP success 
story was also attributable to a comprehensive strategy encompassing military tactics 
supported by a successful surrender and rehabilitation package, brought into force way 
back in 1999.”74  Still, “while states follow a rigid geography, rebels do not,” 75 as is 
certainly the case in Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh, where Naxal leadership hides out 
whilst conducting operations in neighboring and less secure Chhattisgarh; the Naxals of 
these states have always worked together closely.76  So, while Naxalism has seen a 
significant decline in Andhra Pradesh, it does not mean it has disappeared, and it could 
just be that its forces are spreading to neighboring states.77  
While the government has sold off tribal lands to private corporations, it has 
simultaneously shirked its responsibilities to the inhabitants, which “also provides the 
context for the political vacuum that has prevailed in the area since independence and 
enabled the Maoists to extend their influence in the fringe forest areas.”78  The Maoists 
promise the local adivasi populations who reside in the areas most affected by the 
relatively unchecked growth of industry that they will protect the locals’ land from 
“powerful corporate interests.”79   
In states like Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh, which have large adivasi 
populations that have experienced displacement, the frustrated inhabitants are obvious 
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targets for radicals.80  With their violent opposition to the Indian government’s relatively 
recent embrace of liberal capitalism, the Maoists provide a kind of “buffer zone” between 
the tribal people and the corporations that wish to take their land: “They are characterized 
as the only major stumbling block to the neo-liberal policies which were going to sell of 
[sic] land and natural resources to [the] corporate sector.”81  Many of those who have 
been driven off of their land rely on it for their livelihoods and, with no education to fall 
back on, have no hope for survival. These residents now are forced to live in 
displacement camps, refugees in their own country, operated by government militia 
groups, where opportunities for work are minimal.82  The locals’ attraction to a group 
who opposes the policies that have led to displacement is understandable. In theory, then, 
reversing the trend of disenfranchisement and displacement would help the government 
negate the Naxalites’ influence since it is the absence of state services (meaning effective 
education, health care, and justice systems, to name a few) in these areas that has led to 
their success.83    
Though India’s constitution has provisions “for the social, political and cultural 
rights,” of the adivasi, in reality, the government does not provide guarantees for their 
rights to resources on their lands.84  In 2006, the Indian government passed the 
Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) 
Act, also known as the Forest Rights Act (FRA), in an attempt to remedy the “‘historical 
injustice’ done to the forest dwellers by the failure to recognise their rights.”85  The FRA 
was intended to reverse the decades-long trend, reinforced by the ineffectiveness of the 
Indian Forest Act, of the exclusion of the adivasi and ensure that rights to their land are 
guaranteed to residents of the tribal, forested regions and that “forest communities shall 
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not be removed or evicted from the forest land till the recognition and verification 
procedure is over.”86   
While the FRA is considered to be in full force, the actual enforcement of the Act 
has been mediocre at best, however, with the government granting large swaths of 
forested land to major industries without consultation with or proper compensation for 
the local populations.87  The FRA remains the law of the land in both Andhra Pradesh 
and Chhattisgarh and has enjoyed a relative amount of success in these states when 
compared to others, but the fact remains that its implementation has been patchy with, 
“corruption resulting in the diversion of forest land into developmental projects and 
commercial plantations without recognition of the rights of local communities.”88  The 
failures of the FRA to protect the tribals’ lands and to properly compensate the residents 
(with money, land, jobs, or infrastructure projects, all of which the government has 
promised on many occasions to local populations affected by a major industry’s 
acquisition of their land) when the government makes guarantees to major industries for 
the use of forested land has led many residents to threaten to take up arms in protest.89 
Although the FRA was issued the same year that Prime Minister Singh declared 
the Naxal threat to be India’s greatest internal security threat, whether or not the FRA 
was implemented specifically as a measure to combat Naxalism is unclear. The areas 
where it has taken effect, however, are by and large those that have experienced Maoist 
activity. While it seems likely that the FRA was meant to aid communities affected by the 
Maoist insurgency by bolstering industry and spurring economic development, unlike 
with other government projects, there is no explicit mention of Naxalism made in FRA-
related government materials. Furthermore, there appears to be no clear link between the 
successful implementation of the Act and a downturn in violent Maoist uprisings.90  
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Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh have very similar records of implementation of the 
FRA, for example, but the communist activities in the regions in recent years have been 
very different.91  While Andhra Pradesh has seen a significant reduction in Naxal-related 
violence, the Maoist insurgency in Chhattisgarh has remained relatively constant and has 
increasingly targeted high profile victims. This suggests that some other element is 
responsible for the difference in outcomes in COIN engagements in these states. Thus, 
the FRA is perhaps best viewed as one of the many failed government economic 
development programs designed to aid the populations most affected by Naxalism in 
advance of the introduction of the Integrated Action Plan (to be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter III).  
Since the government began its crackdown on the insurgents in 2005, it has had a 
fair amount of success in putting down the insurgency in certain areas with intense police 
and government-supported paramilitary/militia campaigns. The Salwa Judum, which 
translates to “Purification Hunt,” is a government-sponsored militia in Chhattisgarh that 
has used often-brutal methods to root out the Naxalites.92  The tactics used by the Salwa 
Judum have been criticized as violating human rights and have often had the opposite of 
their intended effect, inciting more people into violence. The government has spent most 
of its efforts and funding on violence-based counter-insurgency measures, as opposed to 
more “ground up” endeavors aimed at building a solid governance structure with “an 
effective, impartial police force,” for example.93  
The Naxalites are hardly innocent, however, and frequently employ terror tactics 
against villagers and those living in IDP camps, guarded by the Salwa Judum, to 
discourage cooperation with the government.94  Furthermore, despite the government’s 
offer to conduct talks with the Naxalites to attempt to resolve their differences, the 
Naxalites refuse to halt their violent approaches for talks to occur.95  Unlike the 
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Communist Party of India (Marxist), the Communist Party of India (Maoist) has no desire 
to work within the existing government structure to promote its ideologies, instead 
favoring “direct conflict between the state and themselves.”96  In areas where the 
Naxalites have, in fact, taken over successfully, they have established parallel 
governments, “janrata sarkars,” which persecute those identified as supporting the state 
and have seized land in methods not dissimilar to the government in order to support their 
army.97  The equality that the Maoists espouse is not always evident in their practices, 
where dissidence is not tolerated.98  The Maoists’ attempts at economic reforms through 
land distribution and altering the methods of crop production in order to create an 
autonomous peasant class actually mirror “government programmes following similar 
strategies,” with limited success.99  Thus, in more ways than one, once the Naxalites have 
filled the governance vacuum in a region, their behavior mimics that of the government 
and corporations whose practices they have pledged to reverse and overthrow.   
Due to the backlash against intense, unchecked police and government-supported 
paramilitary violence, the government has begun emphasizing alternative options which 
target the “root” of the problem: land seizure by the government for private corporations, 
which has led to widespread displacement and increased poverty.100  Two years ago, the 
Indian government launched an Integrated Action Plan for Selected Tribal and 
Backwards Districts program in the areas most affected by subversive communist 
activity: “Under the IAP, the government undertakes projects in drinking water, 
electrification, sanitation, school infrastructure and anganwadi centres.”101  This is more 
closely in conjunction with other counterinsurgency doctrines favored by Western 
nations, such as the United States, whose “winning the hearts and minds approach,” has 
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been, by and large, considered successful.102  Along with police action, it appears as 
though these programs have had a positive impact in areas where they have been 
implemented effectively.  
Comparing Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh is important because, although they 
are very different in terms of past histories in terms of combating LWE, they have both 
had success in implementing the IAP schemes. While Andhra Pradesh’s past positive 
experience in countering the Maoist threat gives it an advantage in the process, 
Chhattisgarh can now boast some success in this arena as well. Thus, it should be 
encouraging to note that states in which governance has been lacking still have a chance 
at challenging the allure that Naxalism holds to many in rural, backwards districts.  
1. Andhra Pradesh 
Communism has a lengthy history in Andhra Pradesh, as does the state’s attempts 
to combat it. The Naxalite movement originated in West Bengal but found support in 
Andhra Pradesh from the beginning, when the Naxal leadership from West Bengal 
moved into an underdeveloped, exploited tribal area in the northern part of Andhra 
Pradesh.103  Andhra Pradesh has a large adivasi population, comprising over six percent 
of the country’s total tribal population. 104  Out of the approximately 76 million people 
living in the state, about 5 million of them are considered tribal forest-dwellers.105  About 
85 percent of the tribals in Andhra Pradesh rely on the land for their livelihoods. Because 
of the tribals’ long history of political, social, and economic exclusion and neglect, 
discussed above, and because of frustration due to the unequal distribution of wealth, “a 
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large section of people are angry and feel alienated from the polity.”106  For decades, the 
adivasis in Andhra Pradesh, as in many other states, have consistently seen their land 
given away to landlords or corporations who have no tribal affiliation.107  They are thus 
attracted to the Maoists’ message that the Indian government is imperialist and needs to 
be violently overthrown if the native population ever hopes to have free and equal access 
to land that is historically theirs.108 
Viewing statistics posted on Andhra Pradesh’s website for its Ministry of Tribal 
Affairs (known as the Tribal Welfare Department), one can see the areas in which the 
state has historically lagged behind the country as a whole in terms of basic services 
provided to the adivasi who live there. The literacy rate, for example, for the tribal 
peoples of Andhra Pradesh was rated at 37.04 percent in 2001 (the most recent survey 
available) versus the general population of the country, which was 60.47 percent (the 
general population of the state had a 60.5 percent literacy rate).109  Additionally, from the 
available data, it is possible to see that over the past 30 years or so, the situation for the 
adivasi population in Andhra Pradesh has improved significantly, but that for many years, 
some basic services generally provided by the state, were seriously lacking. The amount 
of land operated by the tribal people has increased substantially, for example, but for 
many years was very minimal.110  Furthermore, the number of wells available to the 
tribals has gone from 2100 hectacres in 1981 to 3,335,600 hectacres in 1996.111    
Because the movement has existed in the state for over four decades, the state has 
had substantial time to try out a variety of tactics to fight against it, which will be 
discussed in greater detail below.112  Additionally, the state has become relatively 
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developed over the past 40 years compared to other states in which the Maoists are still 
very active. One can see the positive changes in Andhra Pradesh’s rural poverty levels 
over the past two decades in the Ministry of Finance’s most recent Economic Survey 
(2011–2012), which shows that rural poverty has been reduced from 48.1 percent in 
1993–1994 to 32.3 percent in 2004–2005.113  Chhattisgarh, on the other hand, has not 
had similar success in terms of poverty reduction; its rural poverty levels have remained 
virtually stagnant, going from 55.9 percent in 1993–1994 to 55.1 percent in 2004–
2005.114  Furthermore, since the late 1950s, there have been multiple attempts to protect 
adivasis’ land rights specifically in Andhra Pradesh, beginning with the Andhra Pradesh 
Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation of 1959 through the Panchayats (Extension to 
Scheduled Areas Act) (PESA) of 1996.115  These demonstrate, to some extent at least, 
the government’s efforts to protect the tribal communities from exploitation brought 
about by unchecked development; these acts, however, have largely been ignored or 
unsuccessful, illustrated by the preponderance of them. Thus, the Communist Party of 
India (Maoist) (CPI(M)), which is the banned political party representing the Naxalite 
movement, has a significant presence in the rural areas of Andhra Pradesh, although 
because the party is illegal, it is impossible to know exactly how many followers it 
has.116     
During the period following the “Emergency,” the late 1970s, Andhra Pradesh 
served as a “ground zero” for rebuilding the Naxalite movement. In 1980, the People’s 
War Group (PWG), now known as the Communist Party of India (Maoist) (CPI(M)), was 
formed in Telangana, a region in the northern part of the state. Telangana still has the 
most active Maoist population today. It subsequently spread to Bihar and now has its 
most active base in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. 117  Throughout this period, the Maoists 
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employed open revolutionary mass organizations in Bihar and Andhra Pradesh to 
reestablish themselves and were “the main organs of mass mobilization both in the rural 
and urban areas.”118  These “open” organizations, which “openly propagate the politics 
of the New Democratic Revolution and prepare the people for armed struggle,” were 
largely responsible for the reemergence of Naxalism and its spread during the 1980s and 
early 1990s, after which Andhra Pradesh banned the movement and the open parties had 
to go underground.119   
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the PWG consistently relied on violence in 
order to obtain its objectives. By 1987, the total number of Naxalites in Andhra Pradesh 
was estimated at 5000. Between 1983 and 1987, it is estimated that the PWG, “had 
murdered 200 people including 35 policemen in Andhra alone.”120  This ultimately 
inspired the state to undertake a massive anti-Naxal campaign beginning in the late 1980s 
and expanding in the late 1990s, which will be discussed in greater detail below.121 
Despite the crackdown on Naxalism in Andhra Pradesh throughout the 1990s, the 
leadership of the PWG was determined to unify the various Maoist factions throughout 
the country in order to establish a stronger foothold amongst the exploited population 
and, thus, have more success in fighting against the government and industrialists 
developing tribal lands.122 
Although relatively quiet during the 1990s, when India’s government was shifting 
towards more neo-liberal economic practices, the Naxalites were still building up forces 
and biding their time. They succeeded with their goal of unification in the early 2000s 
with the merger of the PWG and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), based out of 
Bihar, in 2004.123  In that same year, the government of Andhra Pradesh attempted 
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several rounds of peace talks with the Naxalites. All of these attempts failed, but are an 
implicit recognition of the negative impact that the Naxalite movement has had within 
Andhra Pradesh. Naxalism is still considered a problem in Andhra Pradesh, but is no 
longer a central theme in the state, unlike in Chhattisgarh. 
2. Chhattisgarh 
 While Chhattisgarh is a relatively new state, the links between the region and 
communism are also deeply rooted. The state was founded in 2000 after breaking away 
from Madhya Pradesh in the hopes of harvesting the region that now makes up 
Chhattisgarh’s many resources more effectively and providing the adivasis more political 
freedom. Furthermore, it was believed that a smaller state would mean more efficient 
governance.124  Chhattisgarh, which has one of the most prolific Naxalite populations, 
also has the “largest proportion of adivasi [tribal] people…barring India’s north-east.”125  
The adivasi population in the state has been routinely denied their constitutionally-
guaranteed rights to “a share in government jobs proportionate to their population,” and is 
grossly underrepresented in the state’s political body.126  Furthermore, the issue of tribal 
lands, which have been taken over by the government as “Special Economic Zones” and 
often sold off to corporations without compensation to the adivasis, has become a hot 
button issue for the Maoists in Chhattisgarh: “Land alienation and disputes between tribal 
and non-tribal population and the endless legal redress process is a key cause of increased 
Naxal influence.”127  In Chhattisgarh, ironically, the government’s attempts at economic 
development have led it to withdraw from areas in order to make room for private 
industry, leading to a lack of governance and creating the perfect space for Naxalism to 
thrive128: “Naxal movement gathered momentum in MP [now Chhattisgarh] in 1977 only 
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after the tribals were displaced again and again from their ancestral forest homes for 
making way to developmental programmes etc.”129      
B. HISTORY OF ANTI-NAXALITE COUNTERINSURGENCY 
OPERATIONS: FOCUS ON MILITANCY 
One part of Mao’s ideology that the Naxals seem to have maintained throughout 
their struggle, however, is the concept of protracted guerilla warfare, using Mao’s “five-
minute attack” strategy, which “consists of a sudden onslaught, a brief and furious 
interval of fighting, and then the assault is broken off as suddenly as it began and the 
guerillas rapidly retire, having inflicted as many casualties and taken as many arms as 
possible during the stated time but not lingering even a minute for more.”130  The Indian 
government has never fully grasped how to deal with this sort of struggle, which is how 
Naxalism has been maintained, despite huge counterinsurgency security and, to a 
significantly lesser degree, development attempts.131  The government appears to finally 
be coming to terms with the fact that the elimination of the guerilla movement cannot be 
swift and all-inclusive, as it seems to have wished in the past, however. In its most recent 
Annual Report, the Ministry of Home Affairs acknowledges that, “this is a long drawn 
out battle and needs to be persevered with both in terms of operations against the armed 
elements as well as the all round development of LWE affected areas.”132 
Despite the government’s best attempts at both federal and state levels since the 
movement began, it Naxalism has lingered on. The government has declared the 
Naxalites terrorists and has prohibited their existence under the Unlawful Activities Act 
due to their refusal to give up violence as a primary tactic.133  Virtually all of these laws 
have been aimed at giving “the armed forces special powers not available under the 
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Indian Constitution, so that they can deal with such” rebellions.134  Perhaps the most 
notorious of such acts was the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA), passed in 
1971. Indira Gandhi used this act to justify her incredibly repressive regime during the 
1970s,135 which “aimed at bringing the Naxalite leadership to its knees.”136  From 1975–
1977, a Proclamation of Emergency (martial law) was declared, enabling the government 
to arrest people without charging them with any crime.137  During this time, many of the 
leaders of the Naxal movement were arrested, but many of the movement’s followers 
simply went underground. By the end of what is known simply as “the Emergency,” the 
Naxalites were released from prison and went on to reestablish themselves and the Naxal 
insurgency movement.138  
The Indian government has consistently relied on the law and order approach in 
its COIN operations to deal with LWE, in terms of both laws passed and government-
supported operations. Brutality is not uncommon in the history of the anti-Naxal 
operations: “Various means that include encounter killings, disappearance, rape and 
destruction of livelihood have been employed to punish insurgents.”139  So-called 
“encounter killings,” which is when police kill a suspected militant and then call it an 
“encounter,” meaning an actual conflict between militants and the police, have been 
common in anti-Naxal operations since the 1960s.140  Such tactics have led insurgents to 
go underground and has left innocents vulnerable to attack, since it is difficult for the 
police to distinguish between the Maoist insurgents and civilians. Another problem with 
the government’s law and order approach has been that the troops committed to fighting 
the insurgents are typically not from the region in which they are stationed and thus 
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believe the whole village as involved in the rebellion.141  Because of this, the villagers in 
districts such as Raipur and Dantewada begin to sympathize with the rebels, who are 
frequently from the community or have spent much time there in an attempt to build up a 
support base, or take up arms in support of them in order to fight against the oppressive 
paramilitary forces.  
Despite its record of failure in using the law and order approach in its attempts to 
bring down the Naxals, the government has hardly turned its back on police / militia 
operations in terms of combating Naxalism, although it still does not seem to have come 
up with a long-term strategic plan for how to fight the Maoists militarily.142  The 
commencement of so-called “Operation Greenhunt,” a surge in CRPF’s anti-Naxal 
operations, in 2009 is proof of this. In October 2012, the central government announced 
that it would add another 10,000 CRPF troops to its anti-Naxal operations, joining the 
75,000 troops already designated to that assignment.143  Unfortunately, despite large-
scale efforts to attract new recruits in combating LWE, specifically from Naxal-affected 
areas in an effort to pull them away from the perceived opportunities joining the Maoists 
could offer, the government has barely filled any of the positions, which is partially a 
matter of applicants failing the entrance exams and partially a matter of people failing to 
apply in the first place.144   
Additionally, the government is investing in new technology to aid in its anti-
LWE quest. The Ministry of Home Affairs has just approved Naxal-affected states to 
acquire helicopters to assist in their anti-Naxal operations.145  Meanwhile in 
Chhattisgarh, the National Technical Research Organization (NTRO) has established a 
base specifically for monitoring and combating Maoist cadres, both by foot and by 
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Unarmed Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).146 It is believed that this new operation will help with 
intelligence gathering and sharing and help prevent such attacks as the one in June 2012. 
Despite all of its investments in training and technology, the Naxalites’ guerilla warfare 
tactics as well as a lack of intelligence remain the greatest hindrances to the government’s 
law and order crackdown in LWE-affected areas.147  Until very recently, the despite its 
claims of commitment to the dual approach of law and order as well as development, 
India’s government has “overwhelmingly relied on brute force without recognizing that 
the insurgency feeds on Adivasi dispossession and brutalization.”148   
1.  Andhra Pradesh 
In terms of the militaristic approach to combating the Naxalites, Andhra Pradesh 
is considered the ultimate success story, with its highly-trained Greyhound paramilitary 
forces. Formed in 1989 as a separate, elite commando force, the Greyhounds’ focus was 
always directed at the Naxalites, with an understanding of the Maoists’ “protracted war 
model.”149  Additionally, all police in the state receive anti-Naxal training at Greyhound 
facilities to help fight against the Naxal threat. Members of the Greyhounds are given 
additional pay to motivate them. Furthermore, the state has invested in sophisticated 
weaponry and armor for this force. They have their own, localized, command structure 
that allows them to react to threats quickly, without having to wait for directives from a 
central command.150  By all accounts, the Greyhounds have succeeded in combating 
Naxals where they thrive, in forested tribal areas, which is something that no other anti-
Naxal police force can boast.151  For example, between 2008 and 2009, the number of 
Naxalites in the state fell from about 1000 to 400.152  Even with their excellent training, 
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the Greyhounds’ tactics are far from perfect, with “encounter killings” being a frequent 
occurrence.153  More than any training that the troops received, however, it appears that 
the Andhra Pradesh’s advanced State Intelligence Bureau is largely responsible for the 
state’s successes in combating the Naxals154: “It does not have any rigid territorial 
restrictions and can follow up any leads. The intelligence setup has been provided with 
competent officers, ample funds, and necessary technical backup.”155 
While Andhra Pradesh’s use of the Greyhounds has been heralded by many as an 
example for how others should conduct there COIN operations and as proof that a strong 
militaristic approach is the best way to eliminate the Naxal threat, there is growing 
evidence that the Naxalites are simply reformulating their strategies.156  Many of the 
Naxal leaders who help carry out operations in neighboring states, specifically 
Chhattisgarh, are based in Andhra Pradesh. In fact, in late October 2012, two high-
ranking Naxal commanders surrendered to police in Chhattisgarh, reporting that the 
senior cadres of the movement were based in Andhra Pradesh.157  Attacks along the 
borders of Andhra Pradesh and neighboring states are a frequent occurrence and have 
become increasingly sophisticated, with the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
becoming more and more common.158  This leads one to speculate that the Naxal 
problem has not disappeared in Andhra Pradesh, but that those involved have merely 
gone into hiding and figured out effective ways to support their mission without incurring 
the wrath of the state’s paramilitary police force: “it should not be forgotten that the so-
called eradication of the naxal problem from Andhra Pradesh was partly a tactical retreat. 
They [the Naxals] simply crossed the border into neighboring states.”159  This 
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demonstrates that, in order to combat Naxalism at its roots and prevent it from returning 
in the future, different strategies need to be employed to eliminate it permanently. 
2. Chhattisgarh 
Meanwhile, Chhattisgarh’s use of the Central Reserve Police Forces (CRPF), “the 
country’s largest paramilitary force,” and its support of the Salwa Judum (basically a 
vigilante group that has been condemned by human rights groups worldwide), has been 
largely unsuccessful and has likely created more enemies than it has eliminated.160  
During 2005–2008 in Chhattisgarh, the Salwa Judum took charge of counter-Naxalite 
operations, in coordination with the CRPF. At best, it is a paramilitary police force, a 
more extreme version of Andhra Pradesh’s Greyhounds.161  At worst, it is a “vigilante 
outfit,” that has, “formal state policy sanction,” that “appears to be the product of an 
alliance between international and national mining interests and the local elites, 
capitalizing on local inter-tribe rivalries, mediated by national and state 
policymakers.”162  Under the Salwa Judum’s command, virtually anyone could be 
labeled a Naxalite.163  It was not just the Salwa Judum inflicting terrible violence on the 
population of Chhattisgarh, however; the Naxalites were and are guilty of numerous 
atrocities as well, such as the April 2010 massacre of 76 CRPF officers in the Dantewada 
of the state.164  The essential reign of terror inflicted by both the Salwa Judum and the 
Naxalites in LWE-affected districts of Chhattisgarh led to the displacement of entire 
villages for internally displaced persons (IDPs), run by the Salwa Judum.165  These 
camps have largely served to create more insurgents, however. In 2011, in response to the 
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Salwa Judum’s abusive measures in fighting against the Naxalites, including reports of 
human rights violations against tribals, some of whom were Naxalites but some of whom 
were not, India’s Supreme Court ruled that Chhattisgarh cease its support for the 
organization.166  Going one step further, the Supreme Court also ruled that Chhattisgarh 
end it sponsorship of “Special Police Officers” (SPOs), which is what members of the 
Salwa Judum were considered, because of the inadequacy of training they receive from 
the state, placing them at risk of incurring and inflicting human rights violations.167 
In the wake of the outlawing of the Salwa Judum, the CRPF has not fared well in 
Chhattisgarh, either. Part of the problem is that the CRPF was “Not originally created to 
counter local insurgency” and “it must depend on local police for the success of the 
mantra ‘clear, hold, develop.’”168  The CRPF works with state police in carrying out anti-
Naxal operations, in a manner that is often disjointed and reflects an astonishing lack of 
intelligence and misinformation.169   
The failure of the CRPF and local police forces to successfully restrain the Naxals 
and win the support of the local population it is designated to serve is perhaps best 
exemplified by the June 28, 2012 massacre of local villagers during which 18–19 
innocent, non-Naxalites were killed by CRPF officers in the state’s Bijapur district, while 
the number of extremists reported dead has been contested.170  The CRPF originally 
defended its officers’ actions, saying that the Maoists fired first and that it is the 
organization’s standard operating procedure (SOP) to fire in such circumstances since the 
Naxalites commonly use “human shields,” which can include women and children, to 
protect themselves.171  Whether or not this was an “encounter killing” has not been 
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confirmed, however, the practice is very common in Chhattisgarh.172  The CRPF 
incurred six casualties, as well.173  In response to this incident, many different groups 
have expressed outrage about how the state’s government has conducted anti-Naxalite 
maneuvers, with Tribal Affairs Minister Deo describing them as “notorious.”174  The 
incident prompted a re-evaluation of CRPF SOPs to be used in such situations where 
civilians used as human shields may be involved; a meeting was held in with high-
ranking officials from all nine LWE-affected states in attendance.175  The new SOPs call 
for better reconnaissance in alleged Naxal-affected areas to determine the presence of 
Naxalites and/or civilians before beginning an operation.176  
C. HISTORY OF ANTI-NAXALITE COUNTERINSURGENCY 
OPERATIONS: FOCUS ON HEARTS AND MINDS 
While police operations remain a vital part of India’s COIN operations against the 
Naxalites, the tide seems to be turning against the more militant approach and in favor of 
a development-centered one. With the condemnation of many police actions in LWE-
affected states, there has been outcry not just from the local tribal communities directly 
impacted by the viciousness of many of the CRPF’s operations, as well as from the 
domestic and international human rights communities, but also from within the Indian 
government itself:  
It [the anti-Naxalite procedures] has come in for scathing criticism from 
an Expert Group of the Planning Commission. The Group holds: “The 
methods chosen by the government to deal with the Maoist phenomenon 
[have] increased the people’s distrust of the police and consequent unrest. 
Protest against police harassment is itself a major instance of unrest 
frequently leading to further violence by the police, which in effect 
triggers a second round of the spiral.”177   
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It is no wonder, then, that in recent years, the central government has begun to emphasize 
a more holistic approach in its fights against the Maoist insurgents: “It is the belief of the 
Government of India that a combination of calibrated police action [between the central 
and state governments], focused development efforts and improvement in governance 
will yield the desired results against the LWE.”178 
In order to fill the void left by a lack of strong governance in Naxalite-affected 
areas, the government is beginning to focus more and more on development-oriented 
solutions to the LWE problems because when the government is present and people’s 
basic needs are being met, Maoists have less sway.179  While there has always been an 
economic development component in the government’s anti-Naxalite strategy, it has been 
managed very ineffectively, with funds often disappearing inexplicably:  
It’s not that the government hasn’t pumped development funds into these 
areas…Around 11 percent of the budget of the Ministry of Rural 
Development in recent years has been allocated to insurgency-affected 
districts…but the central government does little to monitor its use. In 
2006–07, when we first began our three-year investigation into 
development funds in the insurgency-affected areas of India, we found 
that Rs 5,800 crore has been disbursed to some one hundred and fifty-two 
districts across twelve of India’s twenty-nine states. But, out of that, at 
least Rs 2,700 crore had not been used.180 
In recent years, the Central Government has turned its attention to a new style of 
economic development in dealing with poverty, using a “people-centred, demand-driven 
architecture, completely different from the earlier rural employment programs.”181  The 
first of such programs was the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Act (MGNREGA), begun in 2006 under the Eleventh Five Year Action Plan. While this 
program and others like it, known as Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS), are not all 
directly linked to COIN movements, they have similar structures to that of the IAP, in 
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that they “are implemented by State Government agencies, but are largely funded by the 
Central Government with a defined State Government share” and their goal is to improve 
employment opportunities and infrastructure in backward areas.182  MGNREGA and 
other such programs such as the Supplementary Nutrition (ICDS); the Sarva Shiksha 
Abhiyan (SSA); Road Connectivity (PMGSY); MGNREGA; Housing (Indira Awas 
Yojana); Health (NRHM); Electrification (PMGSY); Drinking Water Supply (DWS); 
Ashram Schools; Forest Rights Act; and National Highways / State Highways have now 
been subsumed under the IAP, which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV.183  
The government is even devoting security forces to IAP programs; in May 2012, Prime 
Minister Singh announced the created of ten India Reserve Battalions (IRBs), which are 
meant to provide security to development project.184  The government has recently 
commissioned five battalions of troops to guard one steel mine in Chhattisgarh alone 
since the plant will likely close in the next few years if sufficient protection from LWE 
forces is not provided.185  The CRPF is also working alongside IAP-sponsored programs, 
such as the construction of railway tracks, in order to ensure the safety of the project 
workers and the ability to complete the development, since these are commonly Naxalite 
targets.   
As with many such programs, including the IAP, there are reports of corruption 
and misuse of funds, however, on the whole “it [MGNREGA] has also notched up a 
remarkable success,” and is beginning to show signs of a positive impact on the prospects 
for economic investment in LWE-affected areas, as discussed below.186  In addition to 
the IAP, the Ministry of Rural Development announced in November 2012 that it will 
begin a “United Nations-assisted livelihood security programme,” in LWE-affected states 
with the specific purpose of combating Naxalism by supporting the growth of rural 
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economies and governance structures.187  Meanwhile, the central government is also 
trying to replicate a program that has found success in Andhra Pradesh that seeks to settle 
land disputes with tribals in LWE-affected regions to assist the adivasi in going through 
the legal process in order to resolve land dispute cases in a timely manner. The Rural 
Development Minister has said that tribal land disputes are a primary cause “‘of the 
growth of Naxalite ideology in Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and 
Odisha.”188  All of these programs demonstrate the central government’s continued 
commitment to fighting Naxalism by winning the hearts and minds of the people to 
whom Maoism typically appeals and by addressing the problem at its root. 
1. Andhra Pradesh 
With the country’s largest state budget and its long history of Naxalism, Andhra 
Pradesh has been able to use funds to fight LWE not only through police forces, but also 
through development projects. Since 1989, the state has taken a two-pronged approach 
towards dealing with the Naxalites, with development being equally important to the 
fight against LWE as the Greyhounds (although the Greyhounds’ successes garner much 
more attention than those of the development projects). In fact, unlike most other states 
that have dealt with Maoist insurgencies, Andhra Pradesh has sponsored development 
projects specifically focused on combating the Naxalites, much like the IAP.189  Perhaps 
the most significant factor to note in Andhra Pradesh’s success in countering the Naxalite 
threat is that, whether it be through development projects or police activity, the 
government has a strong presence in Maoist-afflicted regions:  
What Chandrababu Naidu perfected as the new Police methodology to 
tackle and root out the armed Maoist groupings, this has been exceeded in 
far greater measure and significance by his successor, the Late YS 
Rajasekhar Reddy (YSR) in his epochal shifting of the direction of State 
spending towards the Rural Sector, creation of additional irrigation 
potential (Jalayagnam Scheme), and several Poverty Alleviation 
Programmes never before seen in India since Independence. The total 
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allocations for Rural Sector activities are double that of for all the Urban 
Sector – Infrastructure Development, and Industrial Promotion activities 
combined.190 
This is a testament to how important governance is in fighting against LWE. 
2. Chhattisgarh 
Chhattisgarh’s government’s (and before that, Madhya Pradesh’s) desire to 
develop its economy has long led to a lack of state presence in adivasi communities. Its 
desire to attract investors has led it to pull out of many predominantly tribal regions to 
make way for investors, leaving a vacuum of governance as well as taking away the 
sources of the adivasis’ livelihoods: “In Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh markets were 
opened up to multinational and Indian big business firms…through the removal of transit 
duties. Highways were modernized in Bastar to facilitate the access of industrial traders 
to the main markets, but the condition of public transport and village…roads was 
ignored, thus denying access to markets for tribal forest produce collectors.”191  This sort 
of activity has led many of the local tribals to feel that government development is a 
negative that is only going to rob them of their lands and leave them more vulnerable to 
exploitation. All of this has made the region particularly vulnerable to Maoist 
insurgents.192  The failure of the state government’s security measures to fight against 
Naxalism seems to have led it to reconsider its developmental approach. Outside of the 
recently-imposed IAP development projects, there was little evidence of any vigorous 
attempts at rural development aimed at benefitting the adivasi population directly, not 
just at attracting investment. 
D. EFFECTS OF NAXALISM ON ECONOMIC INVESTMENT (DOMESTIC 
AND INTERNATIONAL) 
In its “Approach to the Twelfth Five Year Plan,” released by the Indian 
Government’s Planning Commission in October 2011, the need for rapid economic 
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growth is the first item in a large list of goals for the country. For a movement whose 
primary goal is to bring down the government, pursuing strategies to attack its economic 
infrastructure is a wise tactic, which is exactly what the Naxals have done.193  Despite the 
global economic slowdown, India still has high hopes for maintaining growth of over 8 
percent in order to “generate the income and employment opportunities that were needed 
for improving living standards for the bulk of the population; and second, to generate the 
resources needed for financing social sector programmes, aimed at reducing poverty and 
enabling inclusiveness.”194   
Because of its economic success in the past five years, especially relative to the 
rest of the major global economies, the increased economic growth “has led to a 
substantial increase in government revenues, both at the Centre and the States, resulting 
in a significant step-up of resources for the programmes aimed at 
inclusiveness…available evidence suggests that there have been significant gains on 
many of these fronts.”195  The Integrated Action Plan could perhaps be considered one of 
these programs designed with an eye towards inclusiveness. This inclusiveness is, of 
course, what the Naxalites seem to fear, for the targeted audience of the government’s 
plans for inclusiveness includes, “Minorities and other excluded groups…to bring them 
into the mainstream.”196   
As previously discussed, the Naxalites have historically pursued those who have 
been marginalized in areas where governance has been weak or virtually non-existent. 
The Naxalites have attempted in earnest to disrupt the growing economy and to scare 
away potential investors from financing projects in states that have historically been 
vulnerable to LWE:  
Since 2009, a total number of around 1183 incidents of damage to 
economic infrastructure by the Maoists have been reported from different 
parts of the country. The infrastructure destroyed includes property 
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belonging to Public/Private sector units, Railway property, Telephone 
Exchanges/Mobile towers, Power infrastructure, Roads, School and 
Panchayat buildings etc. The damage in money terms runs into hundreds 
of crores [tens of millions of dollars].197 
The growth that India has experienced since the release of the Eleventh Five Year 
plan has been particularly notable in that it has “been more broadly shared than ever 
before across the States…several of the economically weaker States have demonstrated 
an improvement in their growth areas,” including Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh.198 
Thus, it seems that despite their best efforts, the Naxalites have not succeeded in 
upending economic development or scaring away investors altogether. In the last three 
years, and particularly in 2012, there has been a decline in Naxalite-inflicted destruction 
of economic infrastructure.199  This decline seems indicative of the positive effects of the 
government’s efforts in fighting LWE and of the affirmative power that the government’s 
involvement in local development projects can deliver in terms of providing governance 
to populations that have not experienced it before. That is not to say, however, that there 
is still not great unease over LWE activities within the central and state governments as 
well as amongst potential investors, showing that the government’s job is not done.200   
E. CONCLUSION 
While the differences in the tribal populations of Chhattisgarh and Andhra 
Pradesh are not significant, the ways in which the states have dealt with them and with 
the Naxalite threat that has attracted so many tribals over the decades are important. 
While Andhra Pradesh saw successes independent of the central government’s 
involvement based on the state’s anti-Naxalite initiatives started in the 1980s, 
Chhattisgarh’s programs have by and large fallen short of making any significant gains. 
With the federal government, as well as the states’, desire to attract new investment to the 
states and improve the economic and security situations for the adivasi, cooperation 
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between the states and central government is essential. As will be discussed in the next 
two chapters, the Integrated Action Plan works hard to improve coordination between 
governments as well as ameliorate the burden placed on the tribals by lack of 
development and exclusion, all as a means of luring people away from the reasons they 




III. INTEGRATED ACTION PLAN AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION 
IN ANDHRA PRADESH AND CHHATTISGARH 
A. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S GOALS FOR THE IAP 
India’s central government has asserted that the factors that have contributed to 
the rise of Naxalism are “abysmal poverty, under development and a lack of 
infrastructure.”201  After decades of embracing a security-focused approach, 
policymakers have moved toward an approach to fighting the Maoist insurgency that 
focuses on development. The Union Minister for Rural Development Jairam Ramesh 
recently stated that it was important to negate the Naxals’ influence through 
“infrastructural development, political empowerment and employment of youths,” for 
example.202  This is precisely why the federal government introduced the Integrated 
Action Plan (IAP), the goal of which is to build infrastructure and community 
development projects to combat Naxalism and, more specifically, to make the regions 
plagued by Left Wing Extremism (LWE) safer and more attractive to domestic and 
foreign investors alike. Although the government has not turned its back on using the 
police and militias to fight the Naxalite insurgents, policymakers are leaning more and 
more towards the view that Naxalism stems from a lack of development. Thus, the 
government has begun to invest more heavily and with more calculated implementation 
in “development initiatives” in regions affected by LWE, which are predominantly rural 
and underdeveloped. 203  
In a recent meeting of Chief Secretaries from the central government and Police 
Chiefs from the nine states in which IAP programs have been implemented, there was a 
an assertion that the government needs, 
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…to make anti-Naxal operations more holistic by carrying out 
intelligence-based operations against military companies/platoons of 
CPI(Maoist) and targeting middle/top leadership of the Naxals, winning 
hearts and minds of people by a streamlined Civic Action programme, 
psychological operations at district/units levels and security for 
infrastructure projects in the affected areas. 204 
The last stated goal of this list is, of course, the primary objective of the projects 
sponsored under the Integrated Action Plan. Since Prime Minister Singh’s 2006 
declaration that the Naxalites are India’s largest internal security threat, the government 
has made many proclamations about fighting Naxalism through a “two-pronged 
approach,” using both security forces and development to counter the Maoist threat. It 
was not until recently, however, that the government started to discuss and fund 
development projects as seriously as it does paramilitary ones, with the introduction of 
the IAP.  
The Indian government recognizes the complaints of the local populations that the 
Naxalites typically exploit to garner support for their cause are primarily development 
and employment-related in regions that have typically been oppressed or neglected by the 
government and industry. Through a centrally-run program under the supervision of the 
Home Ministry, and direct cooperation with the states affected by LWE in implementing 
the IAP, the government is attempting to form some kind of cohesive strategy that prove 
successful through a population-centric approach. Through development projects in 
Naxal-afflicted areas, the central government strives to diminish the appeal of the 
Naxalites and, therefore, attract more domestic and foreign investment. After all, the 
Naxalites have had the most success in regions that have natural resources that would 
attract large scale investment.205 
In the Ministry of Home Affairs Outcome Budget, 2011–2012, there is an entire 
section devoted to the “Scheme for Reimbursement of Security Related Expenditure 
(SRE),” in which Left Wing Extremism is a subsection. While it does not use the words 
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“Integrated Action Plan” explicitly, the objectives of the central government’s mission in 
cooperating with the state governments affected by the Naxal insurgency are clearly 
stated in subsections 4.61 and 4.62:  
4.61  Under this scheme, reimbursement is provided by Ministry of Home 
Affairs to State Governments for security-related expenditure in Naxalite-
affected districts in respect of… (vi) security-related infrastructure by 
village defence committees. 
Additionally, the districts that qualify for the SRE schemes are granted approval through 
a rigorous evaluation process that considers the how long Naxals have been active in the 
region, the strength and pervasiveness of the Naxalites, how accepting the locals have 
been in embracing Naxalism, and how effectively the local police have been able to 
handle the threats posed by the Maoist insurgents.206  
In this way, the government insures that the funds it devotes to the SRE programs 
will be used in areas that really need them. While the emphasis of the SRE plan focuses 
primarily on security issues, the primary stated objective of the central government is to 
support state initiatives in combating LWE and creating an environment in which 
development programs, such as those promoted by the IAP, can be successfully 
implemented.  
Recently, as will be discussed in greater detail below, the Ministry of Home 
Affairs increased the number of districts that the IAP encompasses, believing that it can 
mitigate the problem in the more at-risk districts by eliminating it in the less at-risk 
districts initially, building a strong foundation from which to fight against the Naxals in 
the most-afflicted areas more effectively. 207  By focusing in areas where there is already 
a strong system of governance in place during the initial phases of the IAP’s 
implementation, the Ministry of Home Affairs argues, swift improvements can be made 
that will negate Maoists’ message that they can provide stability within the vacuum of 
bad governance: “The very idea behind the IAP was to strengthen infrastructural 
development in government administrative areas to such a level that Maoist propaganda 
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of bad governance cannot stand and the people living in their zones also see the fruits of 
development.”208 In this way, the IAP can be viewed both as trying to fix the immediate 
problems posed by LWE and as a preventative measure, to eliminate the appeal of the 
Naxalites by erasing the conditions that lead people to seek their help.   
Furthermore, the IAP is working with and improving upon pre-existing 
development programs in order to target them directly towards Naxal-affected areas.209  
In its annual report from 2011--2012, the Ministry of Rural Development details the 
many ways in which pre-existing programs, such as the rural employment program, 
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), and the 
critical infrastructure construction program, Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana 
(PMGSY), can be tailored in order to best suit the IAP’s objectives and conform to the 
precarious situations on the ground.210        
B. THE STATES’ GOALS FOR THE IAP 
As is the case with the federal government, Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh’s 
primary goal in combating Naxalism is attracting private investors to develop industry in 
the state. In Andhra Pradesh, the Chief Minister of the state “believes that while the 
government has a role to play in the creation of jobs, it is only the private sector that can 
create the jobs needed for the growing unemployment populace. The CM is of the view 
that the government’s principal [sic] role in industrial promotion is that of a facilitator 
which would be good for the investment climate in Andhra Pradesh.”211  The Chief 
Minister’s objective is to create 1.5 million jobs by 2015, and hopes that many of those 
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jobs will be filled by currently unemployed youth, the demographic most commonly 
targeted by the Naxalites.212   
Meanwhile, Chhattisgarh holds the largest reserves of iron ore, coal, limestone 
and bauxite in all of India and had the highest growth rate of any state in the last two 
years with 11.49 percent in 2009–2010 and 11.57 percent in 2010–2011.213  Because of 
this, the state, which was created only in the year 2000 when it broke away from Madhya 
Pradesh, should be incredibly appealing to investors, which it has been desperately trying 
to court in recent years.214  In November 2012, Chhattisgarh hosted an event called 
“Credible Chhattisgarh,” which included some of the top Fortune 500 companies in “core 
sectors like power, steel and cement,” as well as so-called “downstream sectors like IT 
and related areas, biotech, banking, food processing, herbal products and 
automobiles.”215  The state’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry listed a host of reasons 
why Chhattisgarh should be attractive to potential investors, one of the most significant 
of which is that the start-up costs of establishing industries are some of the lowest in 
India.216  The state’s ultimate goal is to create between 50,000–60,000 new jobs based 
off of “downstream” investment alone.   
Thus, in order to assuage the concerns of and remain attractive to potential 
investors, who have in the past paid bribes to the Naxalites in order to prevent attacks on 
their investments, the governments of states where LWE is prevalent are trying to engage 
in serious development and security measures.217  Projects under the IAP may be just the 
way to accomplish this objective: “To be sure, one way–and, perhaps, the only way–
forward for the corporates is to cultivate the trust of the locals–who live in miserable 
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conditions–by engaging with the local people.”218  According to the Chief Minister of 
Andhra Pradesh: “The Integrated Action Plan will pave the way for alround [sic] 
development of these eight districts. It will also result in weaning away the unemployed 
youth belonging to the poor and downtrodden from being attracted to extremist 
ideology.”219   
C. IMPLEMENTATION BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
While the federal government aims to have the programs under the IAP 
implemented by the Naxal-affected states themselves, the Ministry of Home Affairs 
(MHA) ultimately is in charge of the dispersal of the funding for the projects, and, 
therefore, has quite a bit of power. In its Annual Report of 2011–12, the MHA describes 
its Naxal Management Division’s duties as combating Naxalism through security and 
development measures, monitoring the successes of the various Naxal-plagued states’ 
action plans to counter LWE, as well as the application of development strategies being 
executed by divisions of the central government in order to assure that funds are being 
allocated properly and effectively.220  At present, the IAP is the key in the Division’s 
support of developmental projects. At its inception, the Planning Commission determined 
that there were 35 LWE-affected districts in nine states, where it was important to target 
Naxalism through development projects as a part of the IAP.  These 35 districts “were a 
sub-set of the 83 LWE affected districts identified by the Ministry of Home Affairs for 
coverage under its SRE Scheme.   This sub-set consisted of those districts where more 
than 20% of the Police Stations experienced some incidents of naxal violence.”221  Now, 
the number of districts in which IAP projects are in development is over 80.222   
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The central government gives block grants to each designated district for the 
district to invest in the projects it deems most essential. During the IAP’s first year, 
2010–2011, block grants of Rs. 25 crore (the equivalent of about 5 million U.S. dollars) 
were given to affected districts. In the past year, 2011–2012, that amount was increased 
to Rs. 30 crore (the equivalent of about 5.5 million U.S. dollars). These grants did not 
come with strict guidelines or monitoring on a federal level to make sure the funds were 
being spent in the manner in which they were intended. The central government wanted 
to give the states the flexibility to spend the funds for IAP projects in areas where they 
felt it was needed most, depending on local conditions. The states are responsible for 
presenting plans “consisting of concrete proposals for public infrastructure and services 
such as School Buildings, Anganwadi Centres, Primary Health Centres, Drinking Water 
Supply, Village Roads, Electric Lights in public places such as PHCs and Schools, 
etc.”223  Direct monitoring of the plans’ implementation and the states’ use of funds is the 
job of the state-level Development Commissioner.224 
  At the federal level, monitoring of how the IAP-dedicated funds are spent is 
conducted through the “IAPMIS” (Integrated Action Plan Monitoring Information 
System), in an attempt to bring “Government closer to citizens and making it more 
transparent and approachable.”225  This program was designed to further the Central 
Government’s attempts to synthesize its own anti-Naxalite efforts with the affected states. 
IAPMIS is a website on which districts that receive IAP funding must post monthly 
progress reports on the various IAP-sponsored projects. The website is accessible to the 
public in the hopes that it will encourage people about the improvements being made via 
the development schemes, deterring them from joining the Maoist insurgency.226  The 
ultimate intent of the program is to allow the Central Government’s Planning 
Commission to determine the most effective ways in which the IAP has been used in 
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order to incorporate those into the forthcoming Twelfth Five Year Plan and develop 
future strategies.227   
Under this system, members of the Planning Commission hold regular 
videoconferences with District Magistrates, Collectors, and Chief Secretaries of the nine 
states in which the IAP has been implemented. Additionally, the website is updated on a 
monthly basis in order to monitor the progress of the IAP projects and to figure out the 
best ways to modify the programs “in order to bring them in line with the aspiration of 
our people in these selected backward and tribal districts.”228  This program is a huge 
step forward in terms of connecting federal and state efforts in the fight against LWE. 
Unfortunately, while there are many statistics and data posted on the website as well as 
pictures of various successful projects, there is little to no information on the actual 
implementation of the projects or if they are having the intended effect of reducing LWE 
in the districts in which they have been implemented. 
Because the states are ultimately in charge of how the funds are spent, however, 
there has been widespread complaint that areas where Naxal violence is minimal, or even 
nonexistent, have received funding. The states have directed funds to areas where they 
want to encourage economic growth, but that are not necessarily Naxal-afflicted. This has 
led to calls for reform from some prominent government officials:  
Citing several lacunae in the implementation of Integrated Action Plan in 
Naxal-hit districts, Union Minister Jairam Ramesh today said the Centre’s 
ambitious scheme should be restructured to give more focus on districts 
severely affected by the Maoist menace. “Today we have 82 IAP districts. 
Out of the 82, [the] Naxal problem is most acute in about 25 districts. But 
we are treating all districts identically…”229 
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Many have proposed a system in which Naxal-affected districts would receive IAP 
funding based on a pro-rated basis, depending on their needs. 230  Ultimately, there seems 
to be a disconnect between those who see an advantage in rapidly expanding the program 
by spending funds on areas that are not the worst-hit by the Naxalites in order to produce 
quick and encouraging results with the intention of popularizing the development 
programs versus identifying and targeting the hardest-hit regions. 
D. IMPLEMENTATION BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT 
At present, the primary responsibility for the success and failure for the IAP relies 
on the nine states that are the most plagued by LWE. By giving the states the primary 
responsibility over the IAP program, it was hoped to bridge a trust deficit that exists 
between state and local governments and “to overcome the governance deficit in Left 
Wing Extremism (LWE)-affected districts.”231  The expectation has been that by 
establishing a strong state presence within local communities and having the state be 
responsible for positive improvements, the locals would be more likely to view the state 
as a mechanism for gaining opportunity, as opposed to the Maoist extremists. It, meaning 
the states and the IAP projects, “intends to win the hearts of locals by providing them 
with employment opportunities and infrastructure. It was meant to act as an enabler for 
the government to reach out to inaccessible villages, empower the panchayats and create 
space for the implementation of other schemes.”232   
The states are responsible for appointing an IAP supervisory committee, led by a 
District Collector in charge of introducing “development projects related to 
infrastructure, health, education and employment in each of the 83 naxal-affected 
districts. The Committee consists of [a] District Forest Officer and Superintendent of 
Police.”233  These committees are to determine which kinds of projects to implement 
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based on their perceived needs of the Naxal-afflicted areas within their states. The 
Development Commissioner supervises how those plans are enacted and how the funds 
dedicated to the IAP are spent. As detailed in the previous section, in order to ensure that 
that the projects are meeting the goals set by the central government the states must 
provide monthly status reports for the districts that receive IAP funds. 234 
The assortment of infrastructure projects undertaken by the nine states in which 
the IAP has been implemented have been varied, ranging from: “School Buildings, 
Anganwadi Centres, Primary Health Centres, Drinking Water Supply, Village Roads, 
Electric Lights in public places.”235  In addition, in its 2011–2012 Annual Report, the 
Ministry of Rural Development instructed that several development programs that were 
already in operation in order to help improve the status of the rural population in India, 
totaling over 833 million people, be tailored to meet the needs of the IAP in LWE-
affected districts. 236  These programs include: MGNREGA, whose regulations regarding 
cash payouts have been loosened in IAP districts because of the lack of easily-accessible 
banks; Indira Awaas Yojana (IAY), which will allow more generous payment and 
construction options for its target audience (impoverished elderly people) under the IAP; 
PMGSY, which has received “General approval under Section 2 of Forest (Conservation) 
Act 1980 for diversion of forest land up to 5 ha for creation of critical public 
infrastructure projects”237 in IAP districts; and Aajeevika – National Rural Livelihood 
Mission (NRLM) – which focuses on helping the rural poor to earn their livings through 
“sustainable livelihood enhancements and improved access to financial services.”238  
These programs continue to operate, but in areas that have been deemed as Naxalite-
affected, they are run under the auspices of the IAP, with a specific focus on combating 
Naxalism.  
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Perhaps the most significant undertaking of the IAP has been the development of 
a road system to connect Naxal-affected areas: “Realizing the road connectivity to be a 
major bottleneck in naxal-affected areas, the Union Government wants to connect each 
habitation in the IAP district within the next three years.”239  In order to pull LWE-
affected communities out of isolation and make them feel more connected to the state, as 
well as to give them more access to markets, healthcare and educational facilities, the 
construction of basic infrastructure is ultimately the primary objective of the IAP. The 
PMGSY has had well-documented successful results in connecting rural populations and 
bringing them greater opportunities.240  Thus, “the Government is…implementing a 
scheme namely Road Requirement Plan-I for the development of 5477 km of road 
network in 34 districts in 8 LWE affected states.”241  In the approach paper for the 
Twelfth Five Year Plan, increased attention to infrastructure improvement is deemed 
“critical for sustaining and accelerating growth. Public investment in infrastructure will 
have to bear a large part of the infrastructure needs in remote areas to improve 
connectivity and expand the much needed pubic services.”242  Furthermore, it singles out 
regions in which the Naxalites are active as being particularly in need of roads with the 
intent of making them feel more connected to the broader population and the state.243  
The state strives to use the successful completion of road construction to demonstrate that 
it can provide positive services to LWE-afflicted regions as well as fill the governance 
vacuum.  
PMGSY, which has been incorporated into the IAP, is funded by the central 
government but implemented by the states: “According to sources, the new highways will 
link the interior regions in these states [those affected by Naxalite insurgency] with the 
mainstream Indian economy,” which, of course, is one of the primary objectives of the 
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IAP.244  These projects have clearly shaken the Naxalites, as they have taken on “a 
campaign to destroy infrastructure being developed in such backward areas. In just the 
first three months of this calendar year [2012], there were 88 attacks on roads, bridges, 
culverts, railway tracks…As a result, many government officials are wary of entering 
these remote areas to tabulate data for the government’s rural roads and rural 
electrification programmes,” making it difficult to determine the exact effectiveness of 
the IAP.245  The data provided through the IAPMIS system, however, show that many 
more roads are being completed than destroyed.246  The “surge” in development 
spending seems to be working.   
In considering the impact of the IAP, it is important to evaluate its 
implementation in states that already had well-funded development programs in place 
prior to the introduction of the IAP, as in Andhra Pradesh, as well as states where 
development was lacking or non-existent, as is the case with Chhattisgarh. Although not 
definitive, a corresponding decline in Naxal-related violence and completion of IAP-
funded projects would seem to suggest that the IAP has been working in both states. 
While it may be more difficult to make the case for the IAP’s success in Andhra Pradesh, 
given the state’s relatively long history of explicit anti-Naxal measures, the case for the 
IAP’s success in Chhattisgarh seems strong. While good governance has enjoyed a long 
history in Andhra Pradesh, this has not been the case in Chhattisgarh. The success of the 
IAP may show just how desperate the population of Chhattisgarh has been for some kind 
of positive state presence. 
1.  Andhra Pradesh 
While it is true that Andhra Pradesh has had the most success in combatting the 
Naxals out of all LWE-affected states, it is also true that it has been implementing 
counterinsurgency operations for much longer than any other state dealing with the LWE 
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problem. The oft-cited Greyhound police force was founded in 1989, much earlier than 
any of the other special forces designed to fight the Naxals. Additionally, the state 
implemented “a comprehensive rehabilitation package…to help those Maoists who have 
laid down their arms to rebuild their lives.”247  The state government has long recognized 
that local development will lead those who might be attracted to the Naxalite message to 
have a more favorable opinion of the state and, thus, be less likely to engage in violent 
rebellion.248  Furthermore, the state realized that the more trust it garnered through local 
community development projects, the more the local populations in Naxal-afflicted areas 
would help it in its mission by providing intelligence and not taking up arms against the 
local government, tamping down on Naxal influence.249  Because of its already-
established local development programs, it is difficult to measure the impact that the 
implementation of the IAP has had. It is clear, however, that, despite the fact that many 
have argued that Andhra Pradesh’s use of a sophisticated and well-coordinated state 
police force has been the primary or even sole source of its success in fighting the 
Naxals, development projects have played a key role in this as well. 
The fact that the government of Andhra Pradesh has invested heavily in a variety 
of Integrated Action Plan-sponsored projects is proof positive that it views the need for a 
creative and collaborative approach to dealing with the Naxals and preventing a 
resurgence of LWE activity. In fact, in January 2012, the state requested that six more 
districts be considered to inclusion under the IAP as, “The programme has already proved 
to be a success in the districts where it is being implemented.”250  Out of all nine states 
that have been granted IAP funds, Andhra Pradesh is “at the top in terms of percentage 
expenditure.”251   
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The state has embraced the central government’s innovative Rural Development 
Fellowship program, which will place highly educated young men and women in Naxal-
affected regions, with the hope that they will develop new, creative concepts for the 
implementation of development programs.252  Andhra Pradesh is allotting R1 crore to be 
granted towards the projects that the fellows develop. Like District Commissioners, the 
fellows will be required to submit monthly and annual progress reports on the success of 
IAP schemes in their assigned districts.253  Although this project was developed by the 
Prime Minister, it is to be implemented by the states and accountable to them, not the 
central government. This demonstrates the central government’s belief that more local 
control is pivotal in the success of the Integrated Action Plan projects and to combating 
Naxalism generally.254  
The state has also supported the IAP’s ambitious goal of connecting Naxal-
affected districts under the PMGSY. The hope is that by providing basic infrastructure by 
way of roads, the communities will not be so isolated and thus not so susceptible to anti-
government propaganda promoted by the Naxalites:  
The programme envisages connecting all eligible unconnected 
habitations…with a population of 500 persons and above in plain areas 
and 250 persons an above in Hill States, Tribal (Schedule V) areas, the 
Desert Areas (as identified in Desert Development Programme) and in the 
Selected Tribal and Backward Districts under Integrated Action Plan 
(IAP) as identified by the Ministry of Home Affairs/Planning 
Commission.255   
According to the National Rural Roads Development Agency (NRRDA), Andhra Pradesh 
produced some of the best results compared to the other nine LWE-affected states in its 
implementation of the rural road connectivity in its efforts to combat the Naxals with 982 
total projects commissioned. Of the projects, 356 had been completed, and 334 of those 
were deemed “satisfactory” by inspectors.  (The remaining 22 were found 
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“unsatisfactory.”)  There are 626 projects still underway, 531 of which are considered 
satisfactory, and 95 of which are not.256 
Of the programs listed as a part of the IAP in the Ministry of Rural 
Development’s 2011–2012 Annual Report, the findings for Andrha Pradesh are as 
follows (excluding the PMGSY, which has already been evaluated):  
MGNREGA (For districts covered under IAP: Adilabad, Khammam, 
Visakhapatnam, East Godavari, Warangal, Karimnagar, Srikakulam, and Vizianagaram 
as of November 2012)257 
 
  Total number of works completed: 1,245 
Total number of works in progress: 972,220 
Total number of works approved but not yet in progress: 2,071,287 
Total number of works proposed but not yet approved: 2194 
 
IAY: In IAP-covered districts in Andhra Pradesh, the IAY has made huge 
progress within the last calendar year alone, with the construction of 13,322 sanitary 
latrines.258 
NRLM: This program had little numerical data available. Instead, what its 
“Programme Implementation Plan” made clear when discussing the effects of NRLM 
projects was the difference that strong governance makes, consistently upholding Andhra 
Pradesh as an example for its excellent program implementation, while listing 
Chhattisgarh as one of the states in which the successful application of NRLM’s 
objectives was very difficult: 
The mobilization gap is considerably larger for states like Bihar, 
Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Orissa and 
Chhattisgarh, in respect of which only an average of 14 percent of the 
rural poor households are organized, compared to an average of 87.5 
percent of the rural households being organized in Andhra Pradesh, 
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Kerala, and Tamil Nadu. The experiences from dairy cooperatives in 
Gujarat and the self-help movement in Andhra Pradesh and Kerala show 
that community institutions create significant system-wide impacts, 
changing the rules of the game in favor of the poor.259 
This last example is perhaps the most telling in terms of the differences between Andhra 
Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. While Chhattisgarh prevailed in its IAP implementation in 
relation to what it had before the advent of the IAP, it still lags far behind Andhra 
Pradesh on many levels because of the simple fact that the state has not had a strong 
presence in rural regions for decades, first in Madhya Pradesh, now in Chhattisgarh. 
2.  Chhattisgarh 
When compared to Andhra Pradesh and its successful legacy of fighting against 
LWE, one must mention the fact that Chhattisgarh is a relatively new state, having only 
been formed in 2000, after breaking away from Madhya Pradesh, which has had its own 
history of weak governance and LWE.260  The state has a weak police infrastructure and 
has not been able to cultivate a police force like that of the Greyhounds, outside of the 
Salwa Judum, which has been outlawed by the Supreme Court, and was largely 
considered a vigilante organization.261  Nor has it been able to create and nurture its own 
successful, anti-Naxalite projects over many years because it is such a new state and such 
programs take time to design and administer. Considering this, however, the state has 
been able to make significant progress in terms of implementing IAP projects and 
confronting the LWE issue head on. In August 2012, Chhattisgarh’s Chief Minister 
Raman Singh implored the state’s population to join in the fight against Naxalism, 
referring to the Naxalites “as the elements inimical to the interests of the country,” as he 
“rejected the claims of the red ultras that they are fighting to protect the interests of the 
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poor.”262  Furthermore, Chief Minister Singh emphasized one of the key objectives of the 
IAP: “…offering jobs to the youths from tribal communities in the state police and other 
government departments to stop them from being misguided by the anti-national 
elements.”263 
Because of the state’s aforementioned desire to attract investment, its approach in 
implementing the development programs sponsored by the IAP has been vigorous, but 
due to the lack of governance, has not been as successful as Andhra Pradesh. Still, it is 
worth noting that, despite the absence of a strong governance structure, notable progress 
has been made. In its execution of PMGSY, the rural road construction program, as of 
March 2011, Chhattisgarh has implemented 872 projects, of which 193 have been 
completed, with 147 of them deemed “satisfactory” by the NRRDA and 46 of them 
deemed “unsatisfactory.”  Of course, this means that there are still 679 ongoing works, 
with inspectors from the NRRDA declaring 482 of the ongoing projects up to standards 
and 197 substandard.264 
Of the programs listed as a part of the IAP in the Ministry of Rural 
Development’s 2011–2012 Annual Report, the findings for Chhattisgarh are as follows 
(excluding the PMGSY, which has already been evaluated):  
MGNREGA (For districts covered under the IAP: Bastar, Bijapur, Dantewada, 
Jashpur, Kanker, Kawarda, Koriya, Narayanpur, Rajnandgaon, and Surguja as of 
November 2012)265 
Total number of works completed: 36,436 
Total number of works in progress/suspended: 73,416  
Total number of works approved but not yet in progress: 12,543 
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IAY:  In IAP-covered districts in Chhattisgarh, this program has made a positive 
impact within the last calendar year alone, with the construction of 2,603 sanitary latrines 
as well as 1,173 smokeless chullas (several of the IAP districts did not report data).266  
As one can see, however, when compared with Andhra Pradesh’s success, Chhattisgarh 
still lags far behind. 
NRLM:  As mentioned in the Andhra Pradesh section, there was little data 
available for analysis, but the most significant aspect to be gleaned from the Programme 
Implementation Plan was the fact that, as with the IAP, the federal government can only 
go so far in program administration; the responsibility of implementation ultimately lies 
with the states and if there is a lack of governance, then it is hard for the programs to be a 
success: 
The relationship between the national and state levels is clear–national 
level facilitates, funds and tracks while the states own and implement. At 
the national level, what can be done is to identify and create information 
about different communication practices, based on experience of 
communications industry and of existing state societies. States will have to 
take these elements and customize them to suit their conditions, as for 
example, what works for Andhra Pradesh may not work for Jharkhand [or 
Chhattisgarh, for that matter].267 
In addition to the IAP-supported projects, the state is seeking other funds for 
development projects to combat Naxalism, which are not necessarily part of, but are in 
the same line of thinking as, the IAP projects there: “Chhattisgarh will invest Rs. 50 crore 
in Maoist-hit Dantewada district to improve infrastructure of the region,” which will, “lay 
foundation stones for a series of development works.”268  Dantewada possesses some of 
the state’s largest mineral deposits and is home to a large number of tribals, thus making 
it the perfect bastion for the Naxalites, who have had a significant presence there since 
the late 1980s. The region became especially infamous after the assassination of 76 
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policemen in one confrontation in April 2010.269  It is important to note that the 
substantial amount of money requested is not going towards police forces, but instead 
towards development projects, indicating a shift in the state’s focus in targeting the 
Naxals. 
Currently, there is an attempt to improve and lengthen the highway system in the 
state in order to smooth the path for development of mines and other resource-generating 
projects. Unfortunately, the PMGSY, or Road Requirement Plan, as it is otherwise called, 
has been thwarted in Chhattisgarh due to Naxalite activity in the area, with seven projects 
running 229 kilometers delayed in the Bastar area of the state.270  This can be seen as an 
example of the lack of governance and basic security in Chhattisgarh, in contrast with 
Andhra Pradesh. Despite this, however, there are positive signs that public and private 
investors are becoming increasingly bold, perhaps as a reflection of faith that 
Chhattisgarh’s efforts in combating the Naxals are paying off and that the risk is not quite 
as great as it was only two years ago: “Despite stiff resistance from the Naxalites, the 
Ministry of Home Affairs…decided to start work…on development of a new iron ore 
mine, which will feed the Bhilai Steel Plant, and construction of a new railway line in 
Chhattisgarh to transport minerals.”271   
The construction of railway lines is also one of the IAP’s primary objectives as a 
part of its commitment to improving infrastructure in order to promote connectivity 
through rural, LWE-affected areas and bring industry and employment to parts of the 
country where opportunities are limited. Furthermore, in recognition of the fact that those 
displaced by such projects often wind up resenting the government, becoming perfect 
targets for Maoist recruitment: “It was also decided to provide financial assistance and 
employment to nearly 200 people who will be displaced due to construction of the new 
railway line.”272  
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Thus, it seems clear that while progress is being made at the state level, there have 
been some setbacks due to poor governance and new strategies on the part of the Maoists 
to directly target IAP-sponsored projects. Perhaps most significantly, the government is 




IV. CONCLUSION: EFFECTS OF THE INTEGRATED 
ACTION PLAN 
A. POSITIVE IMPACTS 
In its Annual Report of 2011–2012, the Ministry of Home Affairs reported that 
considerable successes had been achieved in the fight against LWE. It cautioned that the 
battle against the Naxalites would continue to be a protracted one: “…this is a long drawn 
out battle and needs to be persevered with both in terms of operations against the armed 
elements as well as the all round development of LWE affected areas.”273 
Since its inception, over 81,000 projects have been approved under the IAP, of 
which, over 61,000 have been completed, a remarkable feat for a program that has been 
active for only two years.274  As of November 2012, “The total funds released so far for 
the year 2011–2012 is Rs. 1090 crore and the total funds released so far since the 
commencement of the Scheme is Rs. 2590 crore. Against the total amount of Rs. 2590 
crores released so far to the 9 States, the expenditure…is Rs. 1468.83 crore i.e. 56.71% of 
the funds released.”275  According to the latest report from the Ministry of Home Affairs, 
Andhra Pradesh has completed 702 of 1140 projects commissioned, while Chhattisgarh 
has completed 6115 of 14,718 projects.276  The projects include: Supplementary 
Nutrition (ICDS); the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA); Road Connectivity (PMGSY); 
MGNREGA; Housing (Indira Awas Yojana); Health (NRHM); Electrification (PMGSY); 
Drinking Water Supply (DWS); Ashram Schools; Forest Rights Act; and National 
Highways/State Highways/Road construction.277 
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Soon, one-fifth of the villages under the IAP will have round-the-clock water 
supply due to development projects launched under the plan: “The Union ministries of 
finance, new and renewable energy, and drinking water and sanitation have come 
together to ensure that clean drinking water is supplied to 10,000 naxal-hit villages on a 
24/7 basis under the Integrated action plan of the central government.”278  Given the fact 
that many of India’s most prominent cities do not enjoy such privileges, this is a huge 
accomplishment. This is truly an example of federal, state, and local agencies and 
officials working together in order to make inroads into Maoist-afflicted areas and to 
demonstrate the positive effects of strong governance, which will develop trust between 
local populations and the state.279  Furthermore, it is proof to potential domestic and 
international investors that the government takes the Maoist threat seriously and is doing 
everything within its power to negate it and make resource-rich areas, such as 
Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh, safe for industry. Better still, the new water systems 
are being built in a low-cost and environmentally friendly way by using solar energy 
instead of electricity, which again serves to attract positive attention from potential 
business.   
In November 2012, SAIL, a major state-owned company, committed to investing 
$8 billion in Chhattisgarh, obviously representing a huge accomplishment for the state.280  
As a testament to how confident the state is about its increasingly safe investment 
environment, Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Raman Singh addressed the Naxal problem 
head on in a recent press conference as a part of a global investors meeting, saying that 
“despite the naxal issues, [the] law and order situation is stable in the state.”281  He then 
provided assurances that LWE would not impede upon industry in his state by saying: 
“‘NMDC is setting up a steel plant in Bastar, which is one of the affected areas, and is 
likely to be operational in 2013. So, law and order situation is not a concern for industries 
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to set up unit[s] in the state.’”282  While the Chief Minister does not directly attribute the 
increasingly positive investment environment to the IAP, it is clear that the sense of fear 
that had once dominated the state seems to be subsiding somewhat and that, perhaps 
more significantly, the infrastructure to attract industry is in place or is well underway.   
The state governments seem to finally be getting ahead of the Naxals in terms of 
their fighting tactics, as well. One of the newest strategies that the Naxals have embraced 
is the use of children and women as “human shields” in order to prevent the police from 
attacking and as a means of intelligence gathering, as well.283  It seems that the Maoists’ 
attempts to employ children as soldiers are hitting major obstacles due to the IAP, 
however. In a seemingly direct attempt to counter the Naxals’ recruitment of youth, the 
state of Jharkhand has introduced a program under the IAP that aims to provide the 
state’s youth with vocational training in order to mitigate the allure that LWE may hold. 
The scheme will provide 250 boys and girls mechanical and computer skills at a well-
recognized school that guarantees jobs after training has been completed.284  Because of 
this, Maoist insurgents have been using increased pressure to try to force youth to join 
their movements, but to no avail. Even the police recognize that the dramatic turnaround 
in Naxal recruitment of youth is due to the IAP:  
Police claims that this is owing to welfare projects taken up by security 
forces under Integrated Action Plan (IAP). “Earlier, Maoists lured the 
youths and promised a fixed salary, which at times went up to Rs 5,000 
per month. The situation has changed over the last couple of years as 
youngsters get jobs in construction projects launched under IAP and are 
reluctant to live a rebel’s dangerous life,” said a police officer.285  
Most significantly, the numbers of casualties inflicted by the Maoists speak for 
themselves.  2012 is on track to have the lowest figures associated with violent Naxal 
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action since 2004.286  Since the implementation of the IAP, the scale of Naxalite attacks 
has been lessened considerably:  
The quantum of violence as well as the resultant killings perpetrated by 
the Maoists in 2011 was relatively low in comparison to 2010. In the year 
2011, as many as 1,755 Naxal incidents took place causing 606 deaths 
(464 civilian and 142 security forces’ casualties) in contrast to 2,213 
incidents with 1,005 deaths (720 civilian and 285 security forces’ 
casualties) in 2010.287   
This trend only seems to be improving in 2012 as “The number of violent incidents 
involving Maoists dropped this year to 1,198 from 1,760 such incidents in 2011. ‘2012 
could be the first time in nine years that could see number of people killed by Maoists 
below 500 and number of violent incidents below 1,500,’ a senior home ministry official 
said.”288   
Notably, the greatest decline in Naxal-inflicted violence has been in Chhattisgarh, 
where Chief Minister Raman Singh has called substantial attention to the Naxalite 
problem and has invested heavily in both security and development projects specifically 
targeted at derailing the Naxal influence: “The casualties at the hands of Maoists in 
Chhattisgarh have halved - from 181 in the first ten months last year to just 93 this year. 
In 2010, 343 people were killed just in Chhattisgarh, including the 75 CRPF men killed 
by Maoists in Dantewada.”289  While a consolidation in the Central Reserve Police 
Force’s strategies have no doubt helped improve the situation, we have seen such surges 
before that did not correspond with a subsequent decline in violence. 
B. SETBACKS    
Despite the many indications of positive improvements brought about by the 
development projects made possible by the IAP, many obstacles remain in the Indian 
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government’s efforts to erase Naxalism for good. Although Chhattisgarh and Andhra 
Pradesh have invested heavily in IAP projects and appear to have used the funds with 
their intended effect, Naxal-related activity continues to thwart many of the IAP-funded 
projects.   
As significant as the construction of new roads is to combating Naxalism, not to 
mention an integral part of the IAP, it appears that the rebels have made the destruction 
of the newly-constructed infrastructure systems a major priority, creating an environment 
of terror for those hired to build the roads, who are too afraid to go to work. In October of 
2012, Maoist insurgents attacked construction workers working on a bridge project as a 
means of warning others not to participate in construction activities.290  In the LWE-
plagued Sukma district of Chhattisgarh, which is primarily inhabited by tribals, alone: 
Of the total 418 kilometers long roads in the district, only six roads–with a 
total length of 168 kilometers–are in a condition where vehicles can 
run…Construction work of four other roads of a total length of 250 kms 
have been thwarted due to Maoist threat, adversely affecting movement of 
vehicles in the area…The revels have dug up this road at many places, 
blew up culverts and laid landmines at several places on this stretch.291  
These desperate sorts of actions can possibly be seen as the Naxalites’ recognition 
that the more widespread economic development projects become, the less successful 
they will be in attracting new recruits and disrupting the spread of governance. It is still 
impossible to predict whether this is true, however. The central government seems to 
have enough faith in the prospects and the results of the IAP to continue it for the time 
being, although it is going to rework aspects of it in order to give more power to the local 
governments involved. 
C. LOOKING AHEAD: IMPLEMENTATION AT THE COMMUNITY 
LEVEL 
At the moment, a debate is raging between the leaders of the Ministry of Home 
Affairs (MHA) and the Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD) over the role of the 
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Ministry of Panchayati Raj and Tribal Affairs in the implementation of the IAP. The 
Ministry of Home Affairs would like to maintain the status quo of the state-level 
“Committee headed by the District Collector (DC) assisted by the Superintendent of 
Police (SP) of the district and the Divisional Forest Officer (DFO).”292   
The Ministry of Rural Development, on the other hand, would like funding for 
IAP projects to be directed to local committees and officials, such as the Panchayat and 
Gram Sabhas.293  The Gram Panchayats and Gram Sabhas are similar to village councils 
that conduct deliberative polling in order to get local villagers’ opinions on issues 
confronting their communities; the Panchayati Raj serves as a sort of intermediary 
between the state government and the villagers. Traditionally, these forums are where 
local development projects have originated.294  Without the involvement of Panchayati 
Raj institutions in IAP projects, the MoRD argues, the local populations feel left out and 
alienated, as opposed to included and able to take pride in what they have constructed. 
Furthermore, the MoRD argues that, without the “active involvement of local elected 
representatives…the money does not get spend [sic] where it should be.”295  By 
incorporating local, tribal populations into the planning and implementation of the 
schemes more and more in the future, it is hoped that the tribals will feel pride in 
ownership as well as be able to see the positive effects that state-sponsored development 
can bring. The MHA takes a different view, believing that maintaining the current system 
will help the state-level administration to build more trust in Naxalite-affected regions.296 
At present, however, community-level organizations have little to do with the 
course that the IAP projects take. Unfortunately, this is a cause of tension between the 
local communities and tribals and those actually in charge of determining which projects 
will be pursued and where: “In the absence of local representatives, the Divisional Forest 
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Officer and Superintendent of Police are two authorities whom the locals see as a part of 
the problem.”297  This is not to say, however, that members of the community are 
completely excluded from participating in the actual development projects themselves.   
In late October 2012, the Government of India’s Planning Commission 
recommended the adoption of the plan put forth by the Ministry of Rural Development 
beginning in 2012–2013. There will be much more involvement of the Gram Panchayats 
and Gram Sabhas, as the IAP program will be merged under the Backward Regions Grant 
Fund, also known as the Backward Rural Grant Fund, (BRGF).298  The IAP could, in 
effect, be considered a supplementary program to the BRGF, which is meant to correct 
uneven development in rural regions, but whose focus in not specifically combating 
Naxalism.299  The BRGF was created in 2006 in order to spur development in rural, 
backwards regions and, thus, to promote economic investment in the broader state.300 
Much more than the original mandate for the IAP, the BRGF’s charter emphasizes the 
importance of the participation of the “Panchayat and Municipality level governance with 
more appropriate capacity building, to facilitate participatory planning, decision making, 
implementation and monitoring, to reflect local felt needs.”301   
The soon-to-be published Twelfth Five Year Plan, released by the Planning 
Commission, calls for “a greater coherence among all these Special Plans,” such as the 
Backward Regions Grant Fund and the Integrated Action Plan.302  Accordingly:  
The funds provided for the last three years of the Twelfth Plan through 
this BRGF window for these central Indian tribal districts [in which 
Maoist activity is particularly strong] should be spent on programmes to 
be developed within each district in a ‘bottom-up’ and participatory 
manner. The Centre will not specify anything beyond the heads on which 
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this money should be spent, so long as the districts adhere to this 
decentralized process of formulating the programmes.303   
Furthermore, under the merged programs, there would be much greater accountability 
than exists under the present IAP program: “Progress could be monitored against the list 
of indicators developed by the Planning Commission and additional funds in the next 
three years would be given only to those districts which show progress against these 
indicators.”304  This would ameliorate the concerns of many who worry that, as it is 
currently practiced, the IAP is not implemented in a manner that is most effective to 
combat Naxalism since the local governments have little involvement.  
Under the Twelfth Action plan, the IAP will be redesigned to focus on narrow 
“blocks,” wherein LWE activity is widespread, as opposed to the current system of 
allocating funds to broader “districts,” which encompass both areas affected by Naxal 
activity and those that are not, and:  
The funding under the IAP will [be] incentivized, with blocks that fulfill 
certain criterion eventually getting more money than the less-performing 
ones. So, a block that succeeds in building capacity to ensure solid human 
resources support to the block administration, follows the decentralized 
planning system, implements the Forest Right Act (FRA) and improves 
utilization of funds allocated in the initial years of the 12th Plan, will get 
more funding in the outlay’s fourth and final year.305   
The new plan will provide “funding of development initiatives at the supra-district, 
district and sub-district level,” and, despite the fact that the IAP will now be part of the 
BRGF, the government is adamant that it will only add to the IAP’s success: “…as a 
component of the BRGF, [the IAP] would be a much bigger and focused programme,” 
with more districts being adopted into it.306  These recent developments demonstrate the 
central government’s willingness to alter its approach to fighting Naxalism depending on 
the conditions on the ground and the successes or failures of projects.    
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